Tuesday, 25 March 2014

Should the CIO be on the Executive Board?


The news that the CIO of Co-operative Group (which has a minority holding in Co-operative Bank), Andy Haywood, is to move off the Executive Board but to remain Group CIO brings a further spotlight onto what is the role of the CIO going forward and, whilst not directly related to the demotion of Mr Haywood, specifically what is the future role of CIOs in banks.

The reporting lines of CIOs have evolved with the increasing use of technology in organisations. Even the title of the person responsible for IT has evolved alongside the technology.

When computers were first introduced into banks their sole purpose was to act as a giant calculator and move what was held in physical ledgers onto computers so that the bank’s financial position could be calculated. The person responsible for making that happen would have had one of a few titles including EDP (Electronic Data Processing), MIS (Management Information Systems) or simply Computer Manager. The role would have reported to the Finance Director or Chief Accountant as that was the department that was primarily serviced by computers. Indeed today in many organisations today IT continues to report to the CFO.

As automation started impacting the back office operations of the banks and IT started being used outside of Finance, the Head of IT or CIO may have found the reporting line moving to the Chief Operating Officer. For many banks today that continues to be the case.

However with the rise of digital, IT has increasingly permeated beyond the back office and accounts departments and an increasingly large proportion of IT expenditure is being consumed by Marketing.

Banks in particular, where fundamentally the vast majority of their commercial, money-making operations are conducted electronically and not in the physical world, IT is increasingly seen as the lifeblood of a successful business. You only have to observe how little a bank can actually do when its IT systems crash and customers cannot access their bank accounts or their card transactions are not processed to see how important IT is to the operation of a bank.

There have been some interesting experiments in terms of what the right organisation structure for IT should be.

For instance at Barclays when Shayghan Kheradipir was Chief Operating and Technology Officer, he had a model where the COO and CIO of each business unit jointly reported to the CEO of that unit. (See CIO/COO joined at the hip). This meant that IT had a voice at the table for the key strategic decisions for that business unit rather than merely being represented by the COO.  With Mr Kheradipir leaving Barclays to be the CEO of Juniper Networks, it will be tempting for Barclays to revert to the more traditional model.

Commonwealth Bank of Australia has gone further than Barclays did by having the CIO reporting directly to the CEO. It is interesting to note that subsequent to that organisational change Commonwealth Bank has spent significantly more as a proportion of overall costs than other banks on refreshing its IT but as a consequence has one of the most advanced IT architectures and platforms of any retail bank of size globally. It is now being able to exploit that new platform to launch new products and services far faster than its competitors.

However with IT increasingly being outsourced, (whether it by the traditional route of selling IT assets to an outsourcer and buying back services or through the use of the cloud), the demands of digital and increasingly Business Intelligence and data analytics, there is a bigger question as to whether there is a role for the traditional CIO at the Executive table? If it isn’t the traditional CIO then who should be providing the strategic input of the role that IT can do to both lead and serve the bank? The skills are far more aligned with a business savvy enterprise architect who has no vested interest in building an internal organisation but is more interested in providing a pragmatic solution, wherever it is sourced from, who knows how to form strategic alliances, both within the bank and outside and who is driven by the desire to use technology to deliver the best value to both internal and external customers.

That doesn’t appear to be what the latest announcement from the Co-op regarding the role of the CIO is saying, indeed the organisational change sounds like a regressive step. But then the Co-op has far bigger problems to address than how to more effectively exploit IT.

Friday, 7 March 2014

This is not just any fee-free current account, this is a Marks & Spencer fee-free current account

Marks & Spencer have announced that they are to launch a fee-free current account. The account will have no overdraft fees, the first £100 of which is interest free and a (relatively) low interest rate for overdrafts of 15.9%.  For those who transfer their main banking account to M&S they will receive a £100 gift card. A key attraction for M&S customers will be the loyalty scheme where points are earned for debit card spending in M&S stores and online. It also passes the critical requirement of allowing customers to bank online as well as on the phone or in store.

A key differentiating feature is not charging a transaction fee for ATM cash withdrawals made with the debit card abroad. For both Metro Bank and Nationwide the lack of transactions fees when abroad attracted customers; however that feature was withdrawn and both now do charge fees for transactions abroad.

On the face of it this is a competitive offering and should be attractive to to both M&S and non-M&S customers alike.

This is not a new market entry for Marks & Spencer (they launched their fee-charging account with a similar loyalty scheme in September 2012) but rather a change of their positioning re. free banking. M&S claims that their fee-charging account has been successful with M&S customers, so this does raise some questions as to why they should launch a fee-free product and at this time.

One of the dangers to M&S of having similar current account products with one offering a fee and one not is self-cannibalisation. Will customers of the current fee charging account be happy to see that whilst they are paying a fee other customers are not paying one for what seems a remarkably similar product? Will some of those customers look to switch to the fee free product? M&S is allowing these Premium Customers to switch their accounts to the free one and will even give them a £100 gift card if they switch their main account to M&S.

Of course this is not just a current account this is an M&S current account. Except it isn't. It is actually an HSBC current account as it is HSBC that is not only behind M&S Bank but owns 50% of the bank. While M&S may position itself as being good for current account competition in the UK market, with HSBC behind it the impact on the market share of the Big Four banks will be none.

Another question that M&S will, hopefully, have considered is what types of customers will be attracted to this account? With no mandatory minimum monthly amount that needs to be paid into the account, customers may only open this account for the loyalty scheme and maintain minimum balances or, as Nationwide found with its credit card, only use the card for cash withdrawals abroad. For a current account to be profitable for a bank it is important for it to become the primary customer account where the customers salary is paid into and the mortgage and other core regular payments come out of it. Without high current account balances or large overdraft fees (which the account does not charge) current accounts for banks are loss leaders. For M&S they need to demonstrably see the customers of their current accounts spend significantly more in M&S stores and online than non-current account customers for the bank to be deemed a success.

For those championing an end to so-called free banking, the launch in September 2012 by M&S of fee-charging current accounts was seen as setting an example to others that would help to accelerate the end of so-called free banking. For those championing an end of free banking, this recent news from M&S that they are launching fee-free accounts will be seen as a step backwards delaying the end of free banking further.

So why have M&S made this announcement at this time? There are already successful non-Big Four banks, particularly Nationwide, Metro Bank and Santander (with their 1-2-3 account) as well as HSBC-owned First Direct who have been taking advantage of the delays and the problems that other challenger banks have been facing in getting their current account propositions right. Now however with Tesco having announced that it will (finally) launch its current account offering this summer and Virgin Money expected to launch its basic bank account later this year, M&S is clearly keen to get to the potential switchers ahead of the others.

But why have M&S decided to launch fee free products given the issues and risks discussed above? It can only because of the need for volume. Running a profitable current account business with all the investment in infrastructure such as contact centres and IT, in personnel and marketing requires scale. Clearly M&S, despite their protestations, haven't achieved this with their fee charging accounts and they see this as an opportunity to build a bigger customer base which will reduce the marginal cost of running a bank.

It will only be some months after the launch of the both the new M&S fee-free accounts and the Tesco current account that it will be clear whether this move was good news for M&S' beleaguered shareholders and customers or not.

Sunday, 2 March 2014

Why 0% BT cards and teaser rates have no role to play in customer centric banks

The announcement by Ross McEwan, RBSG CEO, that RBS and Natwest will remove teaser rates from savings products and scrap 0% interest credit card deals is another step on the road to recovery for RBSG. RBSG is not the first banking group to identify the unfairness for existing loyal customers when these types of offers are made to new customers. It is however the first of the Big Five UK banks to make this stand.

Banks that scrap short term special introductory rates on products for customers, while they position this as for the benefit of existing customers are not simply being altruistic. They are doing this because they know that by adopting a customer- rather than a product-centric approach to running their bank there can be a significant improvement in the long term profitability of their businesses.

Over the past few years there has been a significant price war in the 0% Balance Transfer (BT) credit card market. As one competitor has extended the length of the 0% interest period by one month the next has extended it a further month. Six months ago the market thought that no one would go further than a 28 month (2 years three months) period but it has now got to the point where Barclaycard is offering a 31 month interest free period. It could be argued that this is really good news for customers as fierce competition is driving better deals for consumers. However what is interesting to note is that the top three places in the BT card table are all being offered by one of the Big Four banks - Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds Banking Group. With their very large deposit and current account bases they have large amounts of low cost money to lend which they, it could be said, are using to keep other competitors out, particularly the smaller players who have to resort to the wholesale markets to fund these loans. By extending the periods so long it makes it too expensive for smaller players to compete.

But why are the big banks so keen to lend customers money apparently free for so long? There is of course an up front a fee based on a percentage of the balance being paid - in the case of Barclaycard it is 3.5% which is reduced to 2.99% by a refund (nothing like simplicity!). What this gives the banks offering these products is short term fees, which, with interest rates being so low, fee income is particularly important for short term profits. None of the banks that offers these products has a competitive APR (Annual Percentage Rate) for additional transactions. The banks also know that these are customers who do not pay off their credit cards every month otherwise they would not have got a balance to transfer in the first place. Until recent regulation came into place forcing banks to pay off the most expensive debt first (in this case the new transactions not the 0% balance) this was almost a licence for banks to make money as every payment customers made was used to pay off the 0% balance meaning every new tranaction that was rolled over the month end would continue to rack up high interest rate charges. Even with the change in legislation, whilst these cards are positioned as a way for customers to pay off their debts, the banks concerned are certainly hopeful that their customers will continue to use their credit cards accruing the bank interchange and other fees for every transaction as well as building a large balance for when the 0% interest rate expires.

The problem with BT customers is that they have had the nous to transfer the balance for a 0% period. This means that they are likely to be price conscious and therefore when the next good deal comes along or when their free period ends some of them are likely to be off again to the next bank or credit card company offering a good deal. Others are likely to rack up debts that they cannot afford and go into arrears. For a bank that is looking to develop long term mutually profitable relationships with its customers the majority of these are the wrong type of customers. These are not customers who are looking to or have the money to take out other products from the bank. Banks who offer these types of products are, on the whole, product-centric. Banks who the only credit card they offer is a Balance Transfer is not customer centric.

Moving onto the removal of teaser rates from savings products. The primary reason banks offer short term attractive rates is to build volumes of deposits in order to be able to lend the money out to other customers in the form of a loan or mortgage. It is also a way of raising the brand of the bank by getting it into the best price tables, on the first screen of the aggregator websites such as Moneysupermarket.com and getting it mentioned by Money Savings Expert Martin Lewis. However being successful at doing this can have at least two downsides. Firstly the bank can end up with more low or no margin deposits than it has the demand to lend which leads to losses and secondly it attracts price sensitive customers aka, price tarts. The problem with price tarts, as the name implies, is that as soon as the introductory rate expires they will be off taking their money and giving it to the next bank that has decided to get offer a teaser rate. Just like the with Balance Transfer Card these are not the types of customers that a long term profitable bank should be built upon. With both product strategies it is a case of quantity being sacrificed for quality and taking a product perspective over a customer one.

However  it would be wrong to think that there are no downsides to a strategy that strictly adheres to the principle that existing customers should never be disadvantaged over new customers. In 2001 Nationwide Building Society, under the previous CEO, introduced a policy that all its mortgage offers would be made available to both new and existing customers. It resulted in retaining a higher proportion of its mortgage customers than other banks but with significantly impacted profitability. Nationwide has moved away from that purist implementation to a more pragmatic approach. It doesn't seek to be in the top of the price tables for its products but rather it seeks out customers that are looking for a long term relationship with the building society as its Save to Buy offering for first time buyers illustrates. The result has been a very significant growth in profitable business.

Ross McEwen sees the turnaround of RBSG as taking at least another five years. The announcements of the changes to the retail product strategy will potentially have a negative short term effect for the retail bank, but in terms of moving RBSG towards being a customer centred bank these are sensible steps as long as the shareholders and other interested parties have the patience to see them through. What he has recognised is that 0% cards and teaser rates have no role to play in a customer centric bank.

Thursday, 20 February 2014

Challengers salami slice away at established banks dominance

The news that Paragon Bank (with an initial capital of only £12.5m) has become only the second new bank to be launched in the last one hundred years (Metro Bank being the first one), the first one to be authorised by the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) and to take advantage of the move by the regulator to simplify the process of setting up a new bank, is hardly going to have banks such as Barclays, Lloyds and RBS quaking in their boots. But is this just one more step in a trend that the big banks cannot afford to be complacent about?

The primary reason that Paragon has decided to apply for a banking licence is not so it can take on the established banks with a full offering of consumer current accounts and mortgages. It is so that it can take consumer deposits as a means of funding loans for the existing Paragon Group business. With interest rates low but expected to rise this should mean a lower cost of capital for the loans that they make than going into the wholesale market. With the experience that Richard Doe, the former ING Direct UK Chief Executive, brings from his former employer the new bank should be a success in competing for deposit balances. The low cost direct model for deposits has already been proven by the likes of the now defunct Egg and ING Direct. Whilst the press release from Paragon may talk about offering loans and asset finance it is clear from the recruitment of Richard Doe that the new bank will be initially focussed on raising the all important deposits.

Paragon Mortgages specialises in the Buy To Let (BTL) market for the residential market and has been very successful at this surviving during the crisis where the likes of Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & Leicester failed. It is this focus on a specific customer segment that gives it the advantage over the Big Five UK banks - Barclays, RBS, Lloyds, HSBC and Santander. It has taken the opportunity to build deep expetise in Buy To Let and are front of mind for mortgage brokers looking to play BTL business.

Competition in the BTL sector was decimated following the financial crisis with many small players and building players going out of business. However competition is picking up again with all of the Big Five, Nationwide and some of the other building societies increasingly attracted by the bigger margins that the Buy To Let market attracts over owner-occupied residential mortgages. Paragon is, to many extents, the incumbent that the other banks have to shake. It should still be able to succeed in this market because it isn't just another business for them it is the only business segment they are in. Paragon does not have the cost of running expensive branch networks distributing either directly or via brokers. As long as they can continue to excel in the service they provide to brokers and to landlords they should be able to continue to punch above their weights against the larger generalist players.

While the politicians champion the idea of a few large challenger banks coming into the market to take on the Big Five banks and reduce their market shares in deposits, current accounts and lending, with the Labour Party suggesting that they will break the banks up should they come into power, a different reality is going on in the market. The likes of TSB (still owned by Lloyds Banking Group but due to float), William & Glynn's (owned by RBSG and, again, due to float) and Tesco Bank attract the most attention from politicians and the media, but in the background smaller niche players have quietly gone about picking off rich segments of the traditional banks market share.

Handelsbanken with its 170 branches, largely in market towns, has targetted SME customers and private customers with above average earnings who appreciate having a local branch with a local manager who is empowered to make decisions rather than leaving it to the computer or Head Office has quietly gone about building a sizeable, highly profitable and satisfied customer base. Aldermore launched in 2009 focussed on SME customers has lent more than £3bn pounds. Metro Bank has focussed on customers in urban areas that like both visiting branches and having extended hours. There are other focussed challengers either already out there or preparing to launch.

Competition to the dominant banks from challenger banks is already here, it may not always be head on and obvious but rather by quietly salami slicing away the better, more profitable cuts from the market share of the established players, while the big banks are left with less desirable segments. It is for this reason the launch of Paragon Bank should be welcomed as just one more step forward towards a more competitive banking market.

Wednesday, 29 January 2014

Back to the future - a return to supermarket banking or the end of banking for all?

The report on the BBC News website that Barclays is looking at potentially closing 400, or a quarter, of its UK branches which was subsequentally retracted and replaced with a statement that Barclays is 'considering closing branches to reflect the that more customers are now accessing financial services online and via mobile devices',  reflects the sensitivity the big 5 banks have to announcing branch closures and comes on the back of a statement in November 2013 that in August 2014 it is to open four branches within Asda (the UK arm of the US supermarket behemoth Walmart), closing the standalone branches in the same towns. The model of putting bank branches into supermarkets brings back memories of the wave of supermarket banking experiments that took hold in the UK at the end of the last century with the launch of Sainsbury’s Bank (backed by Bank of Scotland), Tesco Personal Financial Services (backed by Royal Bank of Scotland) and Safeway Banking (backed by Abbey National). At that time the supermarkets were seen as a serious challenger to the established banks (despite being backed by them) and the world of banking was going to fundamentally change. It was also the time of the tie-up of Abbey National with Costa Coffee to create new and destination branches – very much building on the revolutionary Occasio branches that WaMu (Washington Mutual) launched in the US.
 
So what happened to all these new visions of banking? Abbey National was taken over by Santander who quickly took the axe to the partnership with Costa, Safeway was acquired byMorrisons who closed down the financial services arm and the remains of Washington Mutual following the financial crash of 2008 were acquired by JP Morgan Chase who effectively bulldozed the Occasio branches returning to a far more business like branch format.
 
Tesco Bank (as it became) with its 6.5m customers continues to make significant investments into becoming a full service retail bank. Sainsbury’s Bank bought out the Lloyds Banking Group share (that Lloyds inherited when it took on HBoSfollowing the financial crisis) in May 2013, however it made it clear that it has no intention of becoming a full service bank and is not planning to offer mortgages or current accounts.Sainsbury’s appear to have no intention of turning its supermarkets into bank branches.
 
In the meantime Marks & Spencer launched in late 2012 M&S Bank operated by HSBC offering a fee-paying current account. With Marks & Spencer continuing to struggle with their fashion lines the retailer is increasingly being measured principally as a supermarket. The jury is still out on how successful M&S Bank but there are no indications that it has been a runaway success.
So why is Barclays trying to re-visit the supermarket banking model? The reality is that it has very little to do with wanting to be in supermarket banking and much more to do with finding a way to reduce their costs by closing their branches. Barclays will benefit from the ability to sell or end the lease on the branches and will have significantly lower costs fromhaving an in store branch than a standalone one. It is also true that this move should make it easier for customers to visit their branches. As high streets increasingly become parking unfriendly through the use of parking restrictions combined with prohibitive parking costs where parking exists bank branches are becoming harder to just pop into or even to access (Metro Bank with their drive through branch opened in the mecca that is Slough would beg to differ). Typically supermarkets have large amounts of parking which will make it easier for customers to visit their banks if they are within a supermarket. It is not only the difficulty of parking that is reducing the number of visits by retail customers to banks. The increasing comfort and acceptance by consumers of all ages of carrying out activities online and the increased penetration of smart phones and tablets means that there are increasingly few reasons for customers to visit branches – cash withdrawals, making payments, getting foreign currency, paying in money into accounts no longer require a physical visit to a manned branch. Increasingly it is only at those key life moments such as buying a house, getting married, getting a loan, opening a bank account that a visit to a bank branch is necessary and some of that is driven not by the desire to talk to someone or to get advice but by the continued legal requirement to provide a physical signature on documents.
 
For those important financial transactions such as arranging a mortgage or a loan it is highly questionable how conducive a branch within a supermarket will be to have a meaningful discussionExchanging confidential information over the sound of the tills ringing and the promotional announcements over the loudspeakers is not what customers are looking for. Neither is taking out a mortgage or a loan one of those spontaneous purchases that supermarkets rely on to increase basket size. As a mother pushes her trolley around with her two screaming toddlers in tow she is unlikely to suddenly decide that she would like to talk to her banker about a loan.
 
However Barclays might have liked to position the opening of branches within ASDA supermarkets as for the convenience of their customers, with the review of their branch network (and the denied closing of 400 branches) with no confirmation that all closed branches will re-open in Asda stores, Barclays are making a statement of intent about the role of branches going forward.



Had the report of the potential for 400 branches being closed stood, Barclays would have been credited with the courage to be the first of major high street banks to make its intentions clear. This would have made it easier for the remainder of the big five banks to annouce their own closure plans. The other banks have hinted at their desire to close branches but none have been bold enough to say how many. They will eventually have to do this because it is an undisputable fact that less and less customers visit their branches. Many of those that visit their branches only do so because there are not currently convenient alternative ways to carry out transactions such as paying in cheques. However with the increasing penetration of smartphones with cameras built in even paying in cheques may soon no longer require a visit to a branch.



The future of branch  base banking is at a cross roads where the big five banks must decide whether they wish to continue to support customers who want to use branches or whether they should encourage those customers to move to banks that see branch banking as fundamental to what they do such as Metro Bank, Handelsbanken, Umpqua Bank (in the US) and Bendigo Bank (in Australia). It maybe that the end of the universal bank serving all segments of customers is in sight.

Monday, 27 January 2014

How to be a successful challenger bank


So assuming you have got the capital raised and have got through the regulatory hurdles necessary to be a challenger bank what the critical factors for success?

Pick your battleground. Given that the big five banks (in the UK) or the Four Pillars (in Australia) or the equivalent in other markets are so called because they have the scale and the established track record trying to take them head on at their own game is a sure fire guarantee of failure. To paraphase the Chinese general Sun Tsu in his ‘Art of War’ only attack the enemy head on if you have a three to one advantage.  A bank that wants to take on the banks across their entire retail customer base is setting itself up to fail. The established big players have the depth of capital and the customer base to play the long game and can besiege the challenger bank until they have used up all their capital and their investors patience.

For challenger banks the better strategy is to ‘fragment’ i.e. to pick off part of the established banks’s customer base, preferably one of the more profitable segments.

By not having a clear customer segment strategy but simply competing for business that can be won from the established banks can end up with the so-called challenger winning the unprofitable business that the big five would happily like to exit.  

Handelsbanken have never sought to be a replacement for the big five banks in the UK for all their customers. They have deliberately adopted a strategy that focuses on small businesses in largely market towns where customers like to use branches, have face to face contact and are prepared to pay for that service. The result has been very high customer satisfaction along with high profitability.

First Direct (albeit owned by HSBC) set out to be a bank for customers that weren’t interested in visiting branches, liked to be able to talk to a person, liked a high quality of service and were prepared to pay for it. First Direct is very rarely at the top of the price tables. Equally First Direct has not tried to grow its customer base aggressively with its market share relatively stable and relatively small. What they have ended up with is the highest Net Promoter Score amongst the banks.

Consider competing from a position of better insight. The established banks have the scale, the benefits of a high margin back book and the deep pockets so competing purely on price is not a long term strategy. Neither is competing simply on not being one of them. Some of the legacy problems the established banks have is their data has grown up from individual product systems, there is a culture of not sharing data between organisational silos, their systems have often grown from a series of acquisitions and are based on old technology. This gives the challenger bank a real opportunity. Designing the bank from the start to be based around the customer not the product, designing the data infrastructure around the ability to analyse, model and forecast not only the customer, but the risk, the external environment and the way the business performance will be managed will give the challenger bank a significant advantage. By having better customer insight offers can be better tailored to what the customer actually wants (resulting in a reduced Cost Per Acquisition), pricing can be based on individual or segment risk (not only for lending but also for deposit pricing) and retention of customers can be significantly higher.

A good current/checking account offering is not optional. Without it being a real challenger is impossible. Unless you have a transactional product, one where the customer interacts with you frequently, you are not going to be able to own the customer relationship and whilst you might win in the short term it will only be for that. When you ask any customer who they bank with their first response will be the bank where their salary is paid into and which they use daily to buy goods and services with.

If the basis of competition is around taking  mortgages and savings market shares off the established banks, then effectively regardless of the ownership structure, this is a building society offering. Building societies have been around for over a hundred years and their attempts to be challenger banks can be seen in the demise of the likes of Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock.

Nationwide Building Society has shown that by having a good current account offering that they are a real challenger to the established banks. (Nationwide has done more than that as well but the current account has been a key building block to their success).

What’s more the current account offering needs to be designed to attract the customer segment that has been selected as part of the fragment strategy.

Most customers see one current account being the same as another. A lot of customers will also have been made more cynical because of the ‘value-added’ or packaged current accounts that were sold in the run up to the financial crash. These were accounts where it was questionable whether the ‘added value’ was worth the monthly fee. There are very few ways of differentiating a current account but certainly for a challenger bank it needs to be designed for being used on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. The established banks, whilst they may have deeper pockets, have old and under-maintained systems which should give challenger banks an advantage (see the comments about IT below)

The danger of coming out with a simple, low function current account is that the challenger bank ends up with the low income, highly unprofitable customers that established banks are obliged by governments to offer to the unbanked. While this may make the challenger bank popular with government it will do nothing to help investors and if that is not the customer segment being aimed for will only lead to brand confusion.

Design the business from the outside in. One of the biggest challenges the existing banks have is their organisation structure which is built around silos, largely product-based and very hard to change. This brings inflexibility and high cost. Challenger banks have a real opportunity to do something different, even if they have come into existence by acquiring an existing player. The way that the bank’s processes are designed should be driven by the experience that its customers, partners (intermediaries, aggregators, suppliers) want and then decide how it can be delivered profitably. Experience doesn’t just apply to getting a customer to purchase a product but also what happens after that. On-boarding is even more important now for retention, profitability and customer advocacy, particularly where business comes from brokers or comparison websites.

What typically happens is that organisations where there is any conscious design are built from the perspective of the bank and how it is easiest to manage, not from the customer’s or strategic supplier’s perspective. The challenger who gets this right will only be able to attract customers at a lower cost (reduced CPA), will reduce customer attrition and achieve higher customer referral rates.

Invest in talent and experience. Everybody thinks they are an expert in retail banking because everyone has a bank account. This is the equivalent of saying that everybody is a doctor because they have a body. If retail banking was really that easy and that profitable there would be no need for challenger banks. It is not only since the financial crash in 2008 that people have looked down on bankers and treated them as of less value than estate agents or tabloid journalists. Prior to the crash many banks employed retailers because they thought bankers were just staff who didn’t know how to sell properly. A probable consequence of the introduction of this retail talent was the PPI (Payment Protection Insurance) and the Structured Investments scandals, where sales techniques borrowed from the retail industry were applied to the banking industry. There is no doubt that the banking industry can benefit from the insights and experience of industries that deliver better customer service and use technology more smartly but that needs to be counterbalanced with deep experience of retail banking. Current account-based retail banking is far from the same as simply attracting deposits and selling mortgages. If retail banking was so easy why have the building societies (Nationwide excepted – see comment above) been so unsuccessful in making a significant dent in the established banks market share? To be a successful challenger bank investment in real expertise of current account banking is not optional.

Just because technology can do something doesn’t mean customers want it. There are plenty of digital gurus out there who are coming up with very imaginative ways of doing banking whether it is different ways of making payments (at least once a day someone somewhere in the world announces a new way of making payments), identifying the customer, wearing technology, and interacting in branches, but just because you can do it doesn’t mean you should. Unless it makes it more convenient for the customer (and many of the novel ways of making payments are cool but take longer than conventional ways of paying) then don’t do it. Being sexy is not a requirement to be a challenger bank.

Start from the goal of zero IT ownership - exploit the cloud, SaaS and outsourcing. The established banks have very expensive and old IT systems which they need to maintain. This comes from the legacy where banks were amongst the first organisations to use IT and therefore had no option but to build up their own expertise. With the maturity of the both the IT and the outsourcing industries there is no reason for banks to own or manage their own IT. Given the problems established banks have had with their legacy systems over the last few years their competency as an IT provider has been seriously tested. Not only does putting IT out to third parties save overall money but it also allows the challenger banks to focus on what is important and that is the provision of banking to their customers.

For many banks using the cloud to provide banking services has been unthinkable. However Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), the former public sector bank, has its internet banking hosted by Amazon. (See http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2012/12/commonwealth-bank-of-australia-run-by.html) If a traditionally conservative bank has done that why wouldn’t challenger banks adopt that approach?

Metro Bank, one of the challenger banks in the UK, has bought the use of its core banking service on a per transaction basis (SaaS – Software as a Service). Its IT is outsourced. When the time it took to Metro Bank to launch its current account is compared with Tesco Bank (which is building its own platform based on a core banking package) then there is a clear argument for considering SaaS.

 Taking modern technology and commercial approaches should give challengers a great advantage; however it isn’t always turning out that way.  A number of challenger banks are being created by the acquisition of assets from existing players. They would argue that by having existing proven platforms that they can be up and running faster than starting from scratch. This is true in the short term but rather than being able to offer a truly differentiated service what they offer is a smaller but more expensive (due to the smaller scale and, in some cases, having to pay one of the big 5 banks to support the IT) version of the established banks. This is the situation that both TSB (the former Verde Lloyds Banking Group 630 branches) and William & Glyns (the 316 RBS branches) find themselves in.  (See http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2013/07/can-tsb-be-challenger-bank.html) In the longer term this is not a viable solution for a challenger bank.

Challenger banks who have acquired legacy IT, need a transformational CIO working alongside the bank’s executives, to put in place a plan to get off the legacy and onto modern platforms enabled for mobile and digital as quickly as possible. They also need to be experts in strategic supplier management. The challenger banks need to educate their investors that this is not optional.

Have an exclusive relationship with major investors and get them committed for the long haul. There are plenty of hedge, private equity and sovereign funds who are interested in investing in challenge banks, however a number of them have placed investments in more than one challenger bank in the same sector in the same country. What does that say about their commitment?

To build a sustainable challenger bank will take time particularly given the limited availability of off the shelf banking technology and the time it takes to implement a new business model. Equally getting a return on these investments is not going to be quick, so investors who aren’t in for the long haul should be politely shown the door.

This isn’t meant to be an exhaustive list of what a challenger bank should be looking at but highlights some of the areas where the difference can be between success and failure.

Saturday, 11 January 2014

Removing incentives won't stop bank mis-selling


The news that Lloyds Banking Group has been fined £28m ($46m) by Britain’s FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) for having a bonus scheme that put pressure on sales staff to mis-sell products once again brings the spotlight to bear on the culture of banks and specifically, in this case, retail banks.  In Lloyds’ case it was not only the benefits of meeting or achieving targets that created inappropriate behaviour but the sanctions for missing targets including demotion and base salary reduction that put staff under pressure. For at least one sales person they felt under such pressure not to fail that they inappropriately sold products that they could not afford to themselves and their family as well as their colleagues.

The typical media and political response to incidents such as this is to suggest that incentives are bad, that remuneration shouldn’t be related to achieving targets as incentives lead to the wrong sets of behaviours.

However simply removing the explicit link between sales performance and pay will not remove the pressure to achieve sales targets.

The pressure comes right from the top. While the new CEOs of banks may publicly talk about changing the culture of banks, putting the customer at the heart of the bank, winning through providing a differentiated service and they may be completely sincere in those sentiments, by the time that that message is passed down through the organisation to the sales people at the frontline it will be measured in terms of targets, which will need to be achieved. Anglo Saxon businesses are run with a performance management culture where achieving or exceeding targets and  giving greater rewards to those who meet those targets than those who don’t  is fundamental to how those businesses operate. While it may never have been the intention of Antonio Horta-Osario, CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, that the staff be put under such pressure that they coerced customers into buying products that they did not need, by the CEO setting his or her direct reports stretch targets that was the almost inevitable consequence.

The reason for this is simple: banks are commercial businesses that have investors who are looking for returns and always have the option to invest their money elsewhere if the return is better. As such CEOs of banks are competing for investment and are accountable to their shareholders. This applies as much to new entrants and challenger banks as it does to the established banks. All of the new entrant banks without exception have investors backing them whether it is parent companies such as retailers, hedge funds, Private Equity funds or individual wealthy investors. Even the building societies and mutual have to look to the external market for capital and those who lend capital have options as to where they lend to and are doing to achieve competitive return.

But is a culture that is about beating the competition, about achieving the best that you can for your organisation really such a bad thing? Certainly the impression that many politicians gives is that yes it is. The sentiments being expressed have strong parallels with the period where some schools banned competitive sports because politicians believed they were harmful to children.  It wasn’t good for children because it meant that some of them would have to experience losing.

The politicians who rally against the banks and banker compensation schemes can’t have it both ways. On the one hand they say don’t want those in banks to be incentivised to sell customers products but on the other hand they want competition. Competition by its very nature requires a level of aggression, it requires you to play to win and for your opponents to lose.

To demonstrate that they are not solely focussed on financial outcomes most banks today use a balanced set of financial and non-financial measures to monitor the performance of the bank and their employees.   Typical non-financial measures include Net Promoter Score (NPS), customer satisfaction, numbers of complaints and staff engagement.  The argument being that by having a balanced set of measures sales staff are incentivised to treat customers fairly and to only sell customers what they need.

Some banks such as Barclays and HSBC have removed all financial incentives for their staff to sell customers products. Instead their staff are paid a basic salary with the ability to share in a bonus depending on the performance of the bank. However, even when that is the case, every customer facing bank employee who has responsibility for helping a customer to apply for a mortgage or open a savings account knows that, at the end of the day, when it comes to the annual performance review whether they have achieved or missed their financial targets will always be more important than whether they have achieved their non-financial ones. They know that their opportunity to receive a pay rise, to get a bonus or to progress their careers is dependent upon their ability to deliver profits for their bank. The financial incentive may not be explicit but it is still there.

There exceptions to this.  A bank that has taken a very different approach is Handelsbanken. At this bank if the profitability exceeds the average rate of its peers, then surplus profits are put into a fund and distributed to all the staff. However they can only receive these accumulated benefits when they turn 60, thus encouraging long-term thinking and loyalty. The staff, including the executives, have flat salaries with no bonuses. There are no sales or market share targets. Handelsbanken has very high customer satisfaction and is highly profitable. The bank has had no problems with mis-selling or wrongdoing.

However this model will not suit everybody. This is very much a Scandinavian model and the pace of growth whilst highly profitable will not be attractive to all investors. Detractors of this approach will argue that no highly talented executive would be attracted by this reward model when there are banks across the globe prepared to reward more in the short term. The sustained excellent results that Handelsbanken have delivered speak for themselves.  Handelsbanken  would probably argue that it has no desire to attract the sort of executives who are interested in only the short term and will move from bank to bank simply for better rewards.

Given that the reality is the Handelsbanken model cannot and should not be imposed upon all banks, what is the answer and how can this type of mis-selling be avoided in the future?

The reality is that it will never be totally eliminated. Indeed if there were never any complaints or if there were never any practices that could be open to question it would suggest that the hunger to be the best, the passion to grow the business was missing. Every sportsman who wants to be the best knows that you have to go the edge to succeed.   There will always be employees who are too aggressive or dishonest. It is that they are identified and the way that they are handled that sends out the signal to their fellow employees as to what is acceptable behaviour. That has to be called out loud and clear and demonstrated by actions from the top of the organisation.

Secondly, while many banks operate a balanced scorecard of financial and non-financial metrics to measure the performance of the bank, the financial rewards need to be truly aligned to that Scorecard and not just to the bottom line. Not only must reward be aligned to the scorecard it needs to be seen to be aligned. This means that for instance if customer satisfaction or employee engagement scores are part of that scorecard and those measures are not met or regulators impose fines despite financial targets being met, that the executives’ rewards are significantly financially reduced. This is something that has not been reflected across the banking industry despite the enormous financial fines handed out to the likes of JP Morgan and Barclays.

Thirdly there needs to be a recognition by investors that the days of retail banks being a licence to print cash are over, that most banks need significant investment both in terms of capital to fund the business but also to provide the infrastructure that a bank needs to have to compete in the 21st century and finally that an investment in a bank is for the long term – measured in double digit years.

Changing the culture of retail banks is not as easy as simply removing incentives, neither it is something that can be done overnight. To have a vibrant and competitive banking industry there needs to be some friction and a world without it will be a lot worse for the consumer.

Friday, 15 November 2013

The end of the COO/CIO experiment at Barclays?

The news that Shaygan Kheradpir, Chief Operations and Technology Officer, has resigned from Barclays to join Juniper Networks as CEO appears to mark the end of what was a brave experiment by the British bank. Back in January 2011 bringing in the former CTO from Verizon as COO of Barclays Retail and Business Bank was a surprising move given that Kheradpir had no apparent background in either banking or operations, let alone in the UK. HoweverKheradpir shook Barclays up from the start. Changing the historical relationship of CIOs reporting into COOs not only in Barclays but in banks and most other organisations across the world by making both equally accountable he made a bold statement. It’s a financial world wrote about this at the time http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2011/05/barclays-cooscios-joined-at-hip.html . Whilst it was clear that not many banksagreed with this move (ANZ and WestPac being examplesthat went the opposite way), there was a lot of interest in seeing whether this radical change was going to make the difference to Barclays Retail and Business bank. This came at a time when Barclays’ investment bank, Barclays Capital, led by Bob Diamond and his close knit team were seen as aggressive, agile and highly successful; something that could not be said about the staid Barclays Retail and Business bank.  Kheradpir challenged the way that Barclays brought new ideas to market introducing agile and the first fruit of this approach was the launch of Pingit, the P2P payments solution.  He also brought in other like minded individuals from Verizon and those with a software background to reinforce the cultural change that he wanted to make. Following his early success, Kheradpir was promoted to Chief Operations and Technology Officer at the Group level and was responsible for driving the cost reduction elements of Antony Jenkins, the CEO of Barclays, ‘Transform’ programme. Much of which has yet to bear fruit.
Kheradpir leaving to go back to the Telco industry less than three years after he joined Barclays cannot be seen as a ringing endorsement for the effectiveness of bringing into a bank at such a senior level someone with no experience of the industry. Certainly there is an argument that bringing someone in from outside the industry brings a fresh perspective and enables them to ask the questions, just like the small boy in the story of the Emperor with no clothes that no one else dares to ask for fear of looking stupid. There is also the perspective, often argued by the consultants McKinsey that bringing someone in from another industry opens up the opportunity to leverage what worked well in that other industry. No one could honestly argue that banking doesn’t need to change. However banking and specifically retail banking in the UK has experimented with this before. The major banks hired retailers to teach them how to put the retail into retail banking. The ramifications of that are still being felt today. Yes bank branches may look smarter, may look more like GAP stores from the beginning of this century, but would there have been the PPI (Payments Protection Insurancemisselling scandal without those retailers for whom selling extended warranty policies which customers didn’t want or need was secondnature?
There is fundamentally nothing wrong with bringing in a senior executive from a different industry to challenge the way that things are done and have been done for many years, to argue for treating customers differently, to change the way that IT systems and change programmes are delivered but for this to succeed there are two critical requirements.
Firstly the new executive must not be so prejudiced or arrogant that they don’t listen and try to understand why the banking industry operates in the way that it does. That doesn’t mean that once they have taken the time to listen and to understand the industry that they apply their experience from outside the industry and fundamentally change the way that banking is delivered.
Secondly the new executive needs to surround him- or herself with open-minded experienced banking executives who he or she can rely upon for their integrity and to provide advice and a safe environment to allow the executive ask the dumb questions. The executive also needs to be confident that the executives working for him/her will tell them when they are talking rubbish. This sadly appears not to have happened in the run up to the financial crisis.
Kheradpir by making the COO and the CIO jointly responsible for the performance of the business units working for him was acknowledging that IT is not simply a supplier to the business of banking but that it is absolutely fundamental to being successful in banking. He was also recognising that today there are not that many banking executives out there that have the skills, experience and competencies to master both the COO and the CIO roles and therefore the next best step was to make them jointly accountable. Antony Jenkins, CEO of Barclays saw Kheradpir as one of the new generation of Renaissance COOs who are young enough to have been brought up with technology that it is so deeply ingrained in their DNA that the barriers between operations and IT can be effectively broken down by being encapsulated in one person.
With Shaygan Kheradpir moving to the CEO role at Juniper Networks the result of the experiment that Barclays undertook can only be inconclusive. Kheradpir simply will have not stayed long enough at Barclays to prove that the new model worked, whether it would have fundamentally changed the way that Barclays delivers banking which is a loss not only to Barclays but also to the banking industry that was watching with interest.

Saturday, 12 October 2013

Why the new Payments Systems Regulator needs to avoid rushing in change


The UK government has announced that the bank dominated Payments Council is to be replaced by a competition-focused utility style regulator for payment systems, under the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), part of the Bank of England. This new body will assume its powers in late 2014 and will be fully operational by Spring 2015. The focus will be on providing competition, innovation and responsiveness to consumer demands in the payments system. It is hoped by the government that the Payments Council will in turn reform itself into a more traditional trade body.

Talk of reforming the payments system has been going on for a very long time with the Cruikshank Report into competition in banking  back in 2000 recommending the setting up a full blown payments regulator, the so-called ‘Payco’. That recommendation was never acted upon, not only because of the active lobbying by the banking industry but also because of the size of the investment required to set up the regulator and the fear of disruption to the payments system in the process. Little progress has been made since 2000 except the slow introduction of Faster Payments and the reluctant abandoning of end of cheques, which had been due in 2018.

The new Payments Systems Regulator may want to show that whilst the creation of the body has taken a long time that it is a body with a mission and at pace. However whoever heads this body should be wary of rushing in change too quickly.

The UK has one of the best set of payments systems in the world – in many ways the envy of the rest of the world. After 9/11 it wasn’t the fact that the Twin Towers had come down or that the US had been attacked on its own soil and that hundreds had died that nearly brought down the US economy, but rather the grounding of all the airlines. In the US at that time (and even today)  because the economy was highly reliant upon cheques (or checks if you are outside the UK) the fact that the planes could not fly the cheques raised on one bank to deliver them back to their originating bank for clearing meant that the US economy almost ground to a halt.  The flow of money was stopped. Given similar circumstances in the UK the impact on the UK economy would have been far less. The UK has a highly resilient, highly reliable payments infrastructure. Britain should be proud of the long history of a payments infrastructure that is only invisible to most because it works and customers take it for granted that when they make a payment it will arrive where it is meant to in the time that it is meant to. This is despite the fact that the systems have, primarily, been built by those 'empires of evil', as portrayed by the politicians, the big four banks (Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group and HSBC).

However the UK payments infrastructure has been slow to change, has failed to grasp innovation and has had to be dragged and screaming towards the twenty first century. The Payments Council dominated by the Big Four banks has had the unenviable task of leading by consensus and with each of the Big Four being competitors has rarely got to consensus and where it has it has been through a suboptimal compromise.

The new regulator has the challenge of addressing the level of competition in the industry, increasing the innovation and making sure that the consumer’s voice is heard.
Despite all the reviews and all the parliamentary committees which have reviewed and reviled the banking industry, a forensic analysis of the payments industry has not really been carried out. Whilst the small banks and building societies who process low volumes of transactions and the new challenger banks may complain they are unfairly charged for access to the payments system the arguments seem to be based on little data and a lot of emotion.
One of the first tasks that the new regulator should commission is an independent, forensic analysis of the costs to both build and operate the existing infrastructure. The natural instinct will be to use one of the Big 4 accountancy firms to do this, however they are so dependent upon fees from the big banks that it is questionable whether they will be seen to be independent. The purpose of this analysis of the costs will be to determine what a fair cost to use the infrastructure should be (allowing for investment to build the next generation infrastructure) and compare that against what is being charge today.
The new regulator has an unenviable task because there is a clear conflict between significantly reducing the cost of using the infrastructure and encouraging investment and innovation into that infrastructure. It is analogous to Ed Miliband, the UK leader of the Labour opposition, saying that he will freeze the cost of utility bills whilst still expecting those utilities companies to invest in green technologies and maintaining and upgrading the creaking infrastructure.
This brings into question whether there can be real and speedy investment and innovation into the payments infrastructure while the big four banks still collectively own it. Over the last forty or so years they have demonstrated that getting to consensus has inhibited progress and has compromised innovation. There has also been a chronic lack of investment in building the next generation infrastructure. Is there any reason to believe that this will change?
The new regulator needs to decide whether the three objectives assigned to the regulator of creating competition, encouraging innovation and responding to consumer demand can be met while the ownership of the payments infrastructure remains with the big four banks.  A solution could be that the big four banks are forced to dispose of the payments infrastructure to an independent business to which they will become customers just like the smaller banks, building societies and challenger organisations. The acquiring organisation will need to demonstrate not only that they have the experience to run the infrastructure the resilience and reliability of which  is of national importance but also have a realistic strategy for the payments industry going forward and how they will fund both innovation and maintenance of that infrastructure whilst actively engaging with consumers. This is not a task for those who are looking for a quick in and out with a healthy profit. Only an organisation that is prepared to run the infrastructure independently of the banking sector for the long term will make any sense.
Without taking a measured, fact driven and courageous approach to changing the payments industry with cross-party support (given the length of time any programme will take to enact) this regulator will be no better than the Payments Council it is replacing. 

Sunday, 15 September 2013

Why Seven Day Current Account switching will not turn up competition

The launch this week of the Current Account Switching Service whereby UK banks will have just seven working days to switch customer's current accounts to a rival has been heralded as a key enabler of competition in the UK retail banking. In particular the Chancellor sees it as a way of encourage new entrants to build up market share.

The banks have been forced to spend hundreds of millions of pounds to rapidly put in place a system that will enable this to happen, however the expectations set by the Chancellor are unlikely to be met.

For a start this assumes that there is pent up demand to switch bank accounts that is held back simply because the process of changing accounts is too complicated or too slow. The reality is that most customers are simply consumers of banking services and see banking as a commodity much like gas, electricity or water. Despite what the banks might want to believe most bank customers rarely or never think about their banks. Who provides their banking service simply isn't  that important to most customers as long as it works.

Not only that but most customers think all banks are alike. Why would they change from one bank to another, even if the new switching services makes it marginally easier than before. Just the effort of researching an alternative bank and initiating the process of changing is more effort than most customers think is worth for the benefit they will get.

With so called 'free banking' it is even more difficult for banks to differentiate themselves for the average customer. When there is no perceived charge for writing cheques, paying bills and taking money out of a cash machine, then how do the banks make a difference in the mind of customers?

The slow take up of the M&S Bank Account can be partly attributed to the requirement to pay monthly fees, particularly given that that the target customers probably do not  believe that they pay anything for their existing accounts.

So-called 'value-added' accounts, where for a monthly fee customers can receive a bundle of addtional services such a travel insurance, breakdown cover and airmiles, have had some moderate success, but research shows that either customers do not use the additional services or they could have bought them cheaper as individual items. They are also potentially the next product to be subject to a misselling investigation given the similarity with the incentives and targets to sell these offerings to customers as were there for  Payment Protection Insurance.

The Chancellor has suggested that if the seven day switching service does not create the flood of switching that he is expecting then account number portability may be imposed on the banks. Account number portability is seen as the equivalent of phone number portability, except it blatantly isn't. Where traditionally people have had to know each other's telephone numbers to contact each other (even for this with the advent of the smart phone the number is stored and not really 'known'), there is little need to know bank account numbers in order to use the banking system. A customer only shares their bank account number with a few people and very infrequently in comparison to their telephone number. The use of bank account 'aliases' avoids the customer ever needing to know their bank account number. Having to have a new bank account number is not the reason people don't switch banks.

Should the Chancellor decide to ignore the evidence and impose account number portability then this will make the several hundred million pounds spent by the banks on the switching services look like loose change. To architect a long term solution to industry wide account number portability (unlike the switching service which has been thrown together with little thought about architecture and long term durability and has created an expensive legacy solution to maintain) will require very significant changes to the underlying banking infrastructure and the cost will be measured in billions and will be borne not only by the existing players but also new entrants. See http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2011/01/why-portable-bank-accounts-arent-going.html

Fortunately the head of the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority, one of the two bodies that has replaced the Financial Services Authority), Martin Wheatley,  at his reason appearance before the Treasury Select Committee has already made it clear that the CASS (Current Account Switching Scheme) should be allowed to run for at least a year to see whether it has had the desired effect before any further consideration or detailed studies of the costs of providing account portability should be started. This effectively kicks it into the long grass and to after the General Election, which will be a great relief to many bank CEOs.

The Chancellor has also suggested that making direct debits and standing orders be moved from one bank to another at no cost to the switching customer should also be imposed on the banks if switching doesn't create the movement that he is looking for. This idea seems reasonable and it is reasonable as that is what the banks do already today, but is not a material factor in encouraging customers to switch accounts.

The ease of movement of  customers is only one half of the argument that the Chancellor and consumer lobbyists make for the introduction of the switching service. The other reason is to encourage new entrants and competitors into the banking industry.

However the ease of attracting and on-boarding customers is not the reason for there being so few sizeable new entrants in the market. With the increasing regulation, the higher levels of capital that need to be held (even if it can be raised and afforded in the first place) and the reduction in the ability to make a fair profit from retail banking makes entering the UK retail banking market unattractive to new entrants. Even Vernon Hill, the entrepreneur and founder of Metro Bank, the first new entrant to the UK for many years, has said that if he knew then what he knows now about how difficult it would be to get a UK banking licence he wouldn't have started. One of the reason that Tesco Bank has been delayed in its full launch has been the time it has not only taken to get a banking licence but also the time it has taken to get its executive's FSA approved.

So now that seven day switching is introduced will the big banks be quaking in their boots trying to lock the branches to stop customers leaving, making amazing offers to make them stay? Will new entrants such as Tesco Bank, M&S Bank, Virgin Money and banks we have not even heard of yet be having to close offers because of the volume of customers trying to switch to them? The answer is almost certainly 'no' because seven day switching is not the answer to creating competition in the market and the time and money spent on it will prove to have been a poor investment.