Showing posts with label Abbey National. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abbey National. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 April 2015

Can Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank become challengers?

The latest results from TSB have demonstrated that it is possible for a bank spawned from a global retail bank to be a challenger in the market. With National Australia keen to get rid of its northern hemisphere business, Nab UK consisting of the Clydesdale and Yorkshire brands, could this business be the base upon which a challenger bank is built?

A history of innovation

There have been several attempts to make Clydesdale/Yorkshire challenger brands particularly under the leadership of former Woolwich Building Society executives John Stewart and Lynne Peacock. After all they were the first people to introduce the concept of speed dating for SME customers whereby customers could meet other customers in the bank’s business centres with a view to starting a new business to business relationship.

Before that in the first internet boom it was Clydesdale Bank that launched Kiboodle a b2b portal for customers to buy and sell products using an online catalogue.

Lynne Peacock also tried to invigorate the bank and take on the Big 4 banks in the SME sector by opening up new banking centres particularly in London and the South East. That may be where there is the most money but it is also where there is the most banking competition. Looser lending criteria in order to build market share has been a major contributor to the current problems that Nab’s UK business has with major writedowns on loans made at that time.

What would it take to become a challenger?

So if National Australia has failed to make its UK operations a significant challenger to the now Big 5 banks (HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds Banking Group, RBS, Santander) what would it take to change that?

What Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank require to become significant challengers to the major banks would be significant investments in digital and core banking to deliver both the sort of customer experience offer the propositions that will attract customers of the Big 5 Banks to switch to them. The banks need to become significantly more efficient and that can only be brought about by investing heavily in automation.

Clydesdale Group is expected to be floated, or preferably sold, in either in 2015 or 2016. What will any purchaser of equity or the business actually be getting?

What do Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank bring?

Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank are very strong brands with a high level of customer loyalty. According to Yorkshiremen Yorkshire is God’s country and anything from Yorkshire is better than from anywhere else. That loyalty by Yorkshiremen to the bank extends way beyond Yorkshire. Maximising the value of that brand and the pride in Yorkshire could be key to future success.

The Clydesdale brand is equally strong in Scotland and particularly after the nationalisation of both RBS and Halifax Bank of Scotland (through being acquired by Lloyds Banking Group). Should another referendum on the independence of Scotland result in a ‘Yes’ vote then Clydesdale Bank could become the only bank headquartered in Scotland which could attract a lot more Scottish customers post independence.

Between them Clydesdale and Yorkshire operate 298 retail branches, 42 business and private banking centres mainly in Scotland and the north of England as well as having online operations.  That is comparable to the 316 branches that the still to be launched Williams and Glyn Bank (to be spun out of RBS) will have.

Clydesdale bank is the official issuer of Scottish banknotes and 50% of the currency in circulation in Scotland has been issued by the bank and has the brand on them. No other bank in the UK has their customers reminded of them every time they spend money. Clydesdale is also the first bank in the UK to issue plastic bank notes.

With loan balances in excess of £27bn, deposit balances of £23bn the two banks are comparable  in size and efficiency with Virgin Money.

Who might be interested in acquiring Yorkshire and Clydesdale?

Prior to the offer to buy TSB by Sabadell it had been rumoured that TSB might have been interested in acquiring the business. However one of the stumbling blocks was that there was a significant overlap in branches in Scotland and that would significantly reduce the value to TSB of the businesses.

Theoretically bringing Nationwide Building Society and Yorkshire and Clydesdale banks together should be an ideal arrangement.  It would significantly boost Nationwide’s presence in the north and Scotland. In return Yorkshire and Clydesdale could replace their legacy systems with Nationwide’s new, state of the art, SAP core banking system and significant investments in digital. Nationwide has significant experience of integrating businesses (Anglia Building Society and the Portman Building Society among others) and driving down the Yorkshire and Clydesdale’s efficiency ratio from an eye-watering 70% to much closer to Nationwide’s own 50%. However one of the downsides of being a mutual is that it is far more difficult to raise capital and therefore as sweet as this deal might be it is unlikely to be feasible.

A merger of Nab UK and Virgin Money would not make sense given the significant overlap of their branch locations even though the combination would build a challenger with sufficient critical mass of customers and assets to start impacting the Big 5 banks. Neither Virgin Money nor Nab UK have a suitable banking platform to build a challenger bank on so there  would need to be a very significant investment required to get the efficiencies and customer experience to the level required to challenge the big banks. Virgin Money has a similar cost:income ratio to Yorkshire and Clydesdale. The level of investment required and the payback period are likely to put off the existing investors in Virgin Money.

An argument could be made for Santander to acquire the business as it would significantly boost their presence in Scotland and the North and it has the technology platform in Partenon that it could migrate Nab UK onto, having already done this for Abbey National, Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & Leicester. However Santander likes to be a distress purchaser and never likes to pay over the odds. In addition two of the core assets of Nab UK the Yorkshire and Clydesdale brands would not be of value to Santander and the subsequent re-branding to Santander could lead to a significant loss of customers loyal to the Yorkshire and Clydesdale brands. All of this makes it unlikely that Santander will want to acquire the business at a price that Nab is prepared to accept.

A question then would be whether a foreign investor could be interested in acquiring the businesses off Nab. Given that Abbey was acquired by Santander, TSB will most likely be acquired by Sabadell then the large global Spanish bank BBVA could be a contender. With its focus on being both a bank and a software business and its recent acquisition of Simple, the US digital bank, then it would be surprising if they didn’t consider this as their opportunity to get into the UK retail banking market.

These are all questions that the incoming CEO for the Nab UK business, former AIB CEO David Duffy, will have to address as he prepares the business for IPO and potential disposal.

 

 

Thursday, 19 March 2015

Why TSB/Sabadell is no Abbey National/Santander



When news of the Sabadell, the Catalan bank, bid for TSB broke it was inevitable that parallels with the 2004 acquisition of Abbey National by Santander would be drawn. After all both banks are Spanish, have global footprints despite having started out as regional banks and are run by family dynasties.

However the two situations and players are quite different.

Sabadell is no Santander

Abbey National having made the transition from building society (savings & loans/community bank) to listed bank, at the time of the acquisition was struggling to decide what its role in the banking market was to be. With its launch of co-branded branches/coffee shops with Costa Coffee and its partnership with Safeway, the supermarket, it was not clear to its customers what it was. Santander came along to change all that.

Through its close relationship with RBS, including non-executive director roles, Santander had been observing the UK retail banking market for some time and understood the opportunities that were there.

Banking platform was key to Santander business case

The case that Santander made for Abbey National was that as leading global retail bank with a strong track record in successfully managing integrations and a world class technology platform that had been at the core of all their acquisitions, Santander could significantly reduce the costs of running Abbey National by replacing Abbey’s multiple banking systems with Santander’s Partenon banking platform, implementing Santander’s  best practice retail banking processes and Santander’s formidable disciplined approach to cost management.

It is interesting to note that despite Santander's assertion that the Partenon platform would be able to work for the UK market it took far longer and was more expensive to implement than originally envisaged.
Santander is quite unique in that as part of its journey from a small regional bank to one of the world’s largest banks IT has been at the heart of everything that they do and they even have their own IT company, Produban. Santander has set out not only to be a world class bank but also a world class IT company.

The situations for both TSB and Sabadell are quite different from that of Abbey and Santander.

TSB is no Abbey National

TSB has a very clear idea of the role that it wants to play in the UK retail banking market. It has strong leadership. As a result of the EU forced separation from its majority shareholder, Lloyds Banking Group, TSB is sitting with an infrastructure and balance sheet too big for the customer base and products that it currently serves. It is also using a legacy set of IT systems that Lloyds Banking Group runs for it. TSB has two main requirements that it needs to fulfil. Firstly it needs a significant increase in its customer base particularly in terms of lending to be able to make a profit. Secondly it needs a modern, agile IT platform that will both be able to deliver the fantastic customer experience that is so core to its strategy and at a significantly reduced cost than it is charged by Lloyds Banking Group today.

Sabadell due to its lack of a presence in the UK market will not directly bring the increase in the customer base or the additional lending, that a UK merger could bring TSB. Sabadell does not have its own IT company neither does it have a track record of building a modern banking system to manage businesses in multiple countries.

Digital excellence

What it does bring is excellence in the application of digital. Under the leadership of Pol Navarro, Head of Digital Transformation at Sabadell the bank has been a pioneer in digital banking and has demonstrated how banks can embrace digital. This is certainly something that TSB would want to exploit.

In addition Sabadell would bring to TSB deep experience in business banking something that inevitably TSB will need to offer to both meet it customer needs but also its shareholders’ profitability requirements.

£450m IT sweetener

Should Sabadell complete on the acquisition of TSB then Lloyds Banking Group will pay it £450m to assist it in getting TSB off the legacy Lloyds platforms. Should Sabadell get this then it should use this as a significant down payment to replace its group wide banking platforms, starting with the UK with a new platform architected for the digital age - agile enough to be able to quickly adapt to the inevitable and continuous changes in the financial services industry.

A Sabadell/TSB tie up would be good for Lloyds Banking Group (and UK tax payers since they are still shareholders), however the case for the deal going ahead is nowhere as easy to make as it was for the acquisition of Abbey National.

Wednesday, 29 January 2014

Back to the future - a return to supermarket banking or the end of banking for all?

The report on the BBC News website that Barclays is looking at potentially closing 400, or a quarter, of its UK branches which was subsequentally retracted and replaced with a statement that Barclays is 'considering closing branches to reflect the that more customers are now accessing financial services online and via mobile devices',  reflects the sensitivity the big 5 banks have to announcing branch closures and comes on the back of a statement in November 2013 that in August 2014 it is to open four branches within Asda (the UK arm of the US supermarket behemoth Walmart), closing the standalone branches in the same towns. The model of putting bank branches into supermarkets brings back memories of the wave of supermarket banking experiments that took hold in the UK at the end of the last century with the launch of Sainsbury’s Bank (backed by Bank of Scotland), Tesco Personal Financial Services (backed by Royal Bank of Scotland) and Safeway Banking (backed by Abbey National). At that time the supermarkets were seen as a serious challenger to the established banks (despite being backed by them) and the world of banking was going to fundamentally change. It was also the time of the tie-up of Abbey National with Costa Coffee to create new and destination branches – very much building on the revolutionary Occasio branches that WaMu (Washington Mutual) launched in the US.
 
So what happened to all these new visions of banking? Abbey National was taken over by Santander who quickly took the axe to the partnership with Costa, Safeway was acquired byMorrisons who closed down the financial services arm and the remains of Washington Mutual following the financial crash of 2008 were acquired by JP Morgan Chase who effectively bulldozed the Occasio branches returning to a far more business like branch format.
 
Tesco Bank (as it became) with its 6.5m customers continues to make significant investments into becoming a full service retail bank. Sainsbury’s Bank bought out the Lloyds Banking Group share (that Lloyds inherited when it took on HBoSfollowing the financial crisis) in May 2013, however it made it clear that it has no intention of becoming a full service bank and is not planning to offer mortgages or current accounts.Sainsbury’s appear to have no intention of turning its supermarkets into bank branches.
 
In the meantime Marks & Spencer launched in late 2012 M&S Bank operated by HSBC offering a fee-paying current account. With Marks & Spencer continuing to struggle with their fashion lines the retailer is increasingly being measured principally as a supermarket. The jury is still out on how successful M&S Bank but there are no indications that it has been a runaway success.
So why is Barclays trying to re-visit the supermarket banking model? The reality is that it has very little to do with wanting to be in supermarket banking and much more to do with finding a way to reduce their costs by closing their branches. Barclays will benefit from the ability to sell or end the lease on the branches and will have significantly lower costs fromhaving an in store branch than a standalone one. It is also true that this move should make it easier for customers to visit their branches. As high streets increasingly become parking unfriendly through the use of parking restrictions combined with prohibitive parking costs where parking exists bank branches are becoming harder to just pop into or even to access (Metro Bank with their drive through branch opened in the mecca that is Slough would beg to differ). Typically supermarkets have large amounts of parking which will make it easier for customers to visit their banks if they are within a supermarket. It is not only the difficulty of parking that is reducing the number of visits by retail customers to banks. The increasing comfort and acceptance by consumers of all ages of carrying out activities online and the increased penetration of smart phones and tablets means that there are increasingly few reasons for customers to visit branches – cash withdrawals, making payments, getting foreign currency, paying in money into accounts no longer require a physical visit to a manned branch. Increasingly it is only at those key life moments such as buying a house, getting married, getting a loan, opening a bank account that a visit to a bank branch is necessary and some of that is driven not by the desire to talk to someone or to get advice but by the continued legal requirement to provide a physical signature on documents.
 
For those important financial transactions such as arranging a mortgage or a loan it is highly questionable how conducive a branch within a supermarket will be to have a meaningful discussionExchanging confidential information over the sound of the tills ringing and the promotional announcements over the loudspeakers is not what customers are looking for. Neither is taking out a mortgage or a loan one of those spontaneous purchases that supermarkets rely on to increase basket size. As a mother pushes her trolley around with her two screaming toddlers in tow she is unlikely to suddenly decide that she would like to talk to her banker about a loan.
 
However Barclays might have liked to position the opening of branches within ASDA supermarkets as for the convenience of their customers, with the review of their branch network (and the denied closing of 400 branches) with no confirmation that all closed branches will re-open in Asda stores, Barclays are making a statement of intent about the role of branches going forward.



Had the report of the potential for 400 branches being closed stood, Barclays would have been credited with the courage to be the first of major high street banks to make its intentions clear. This would have made it easier for the remainder of the big five banks to annouce their own closure plans. The other banks have hinted at their desire to close branches but none have been bold enough to say how many. They will eventually have to do this because it is an undisputable fact that less and less customers visit their branches. Many of those that visit their branches only do so because there are not currently convenient alternative ways to carry out transactions such as paying in cheques. However with the increasing penetration of smartphones with cameras built in even paying in cheques may soon no longer require a visit to a branch.



The future of branch  base banking is at a cross roads where the big five banks must decide whether they wish to continue to support customers who want to use branches or whether they should encourage those customers to move to banks that see branch banking as fundamental to what they do such as Metro Bank, Handelsbanken, Umpqua Bank (in the US) and Bendigo Bank (in Australia). It maybe that the end of the universal bank serving all segments of customers is in sight.

Wednesday, 24 April 2013

Will Verde be Co-op's ABN Amro?


In April 2007 John Varley, then CEO of Barclays, in an attempt to vault Barclays into the Premier League of investment banking made a bid for ABN Amro. Not to be outdone Sir Fred Goodwin put together a consortium consisting of RBS, Santander and Fortis to put in a counter bid.

Through the spring and summer of 2007 a battle took place to win ABN Amro. It could be said that it stopped being entirely about the business sense of acquiring the bank and more about winning the deal, beating the other CEO. This was a deal that appeared to be personal. The price continued to rise.

Finally in early October John Varley and Barclays conceded defeat and withdrew their offer. Barclays was rewarded with being paid 200m Euros as a break fee by ABN Amro. Even at the time of Barclays' withdrawal analysts were saying that RBS was paying too much. One said that RBS was going to be struck by 'the winner's curse'.

The rest, as they say is history. The capital required, the slow down and eventual crash of the global markets and the complexity of the integration all contributed to the situation RBS finds itself in now.

Looking at the Co-op's pursuit of the  632 Verde branches that Lloyds Banking Group has to sell, there appear to be some parallels with the ABN Amro pursuit. Could it be that the Co-op will also be struck down with 'the winner's curse'?

The pursuit of Verde has not been as long as for ABN Amro but it appears to have been as personal. In July 2012 Peter Marks, the CEO of Co-op, boasted that he has taken the shirt off the back of the  Lloyds Banking Group CEO, Antonio Horta-Osario, as they agreed to a £750m price tag. Given that the expectation had been that Verde would sell for between £1.5-2bn, he may have had a point, though he may have been better keeping his opinion to himself.

However Co-op is also paying a big price in other ways to raise the capital it needs to acquire Verde. With the announcement of the sale of its Life & Pensions and Savings business to Royal London and its instruction of Deutsche Bank to find a buyer for its General Insurance business, the Co-op's existing financial services business is being taken apart in order to raise the capital for Verde. Aviva is rumoured to be interested in acquiring the General Insurance business.These deals are not dependent on the Verde deal going through, so should the deal fail the Co-op will be in a much poorer state.

Similarly RBS had to raise a lot of money in order to pay the price it had agreed for ABN Amro. In RBS's case it went to the market and executed a huge rights issue for which in a class action it is now being sued). This left RBS with a highly weakened balance sheet, which made it unable to absorb the massive change in the market. How would RBSG have fared if they hadn't pursued and won ABN-Amro? They certainly would still have had problems with their exposure to Ireland through Ulster Bank and the investment banking business would still have been hit, but with a stronger balance sheet and without the exposure to the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) that ABn Amro brought the size of the bailout required from the UK Government would have been significantly lower. Fred Groodwin would almost certainly be Sir Fred Goodwin and his pension would be intact.

Should the acquisition still go ahead, which is looking less likely, this will not be a simple integration by any stretch of the imagination. The integration of Britannia Building Society has proved to be a major challenge for the Co-op, Verde will far more complex. Again looking back at RBS, Sir Fred Goodwin went into the ABN Amro integration full of confidence that the bank knew how to do integrations, but Natwest was fundamentally a larger version of RBS so it was a homogenous integration, ABN Amro was an integration of something quite different from RBS and the costs of integration ballooned.

One of the worst scenarios for the Co-op is that they sell off the assets they need in order to complete the Verde transaction and then fail to close the purchase. This would leave the Co-op in a weakened position in terms of Financial Services and overall in a poorer strategic position.

Whilst Peter Marks may have got what appears to be a rock bottom price for Verde the Co-op will be tied to Lloyds Banking Group for many years to come since they have agreed to pay for and use the Lloyds Banking Group systems for the Verde branches. It will take hundreds of millions of pounds and  years to move off these systems and onto a modern architected banking system so Co-op and Lloyds Banking Group will be partners for many years to come.  The Co-op may need to be reminded of the expression that revenge is a meal best eaten cold.

In the meantime Santander has withdrawn from the acquisition of the 316 branches that RBS is being forced to sell. Santander is a bank that appears to always make smart deals - Abbey National, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester and Antonveneta to name a few. Antonveneta was owned by ABN Amro and was one part of Santander's element of the consortium bid led by RBS. In true Santander style it sold Antonveneta on to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena before Santander had even taken possession making a $3.5bn profit in the process. For Peter Marks it would be sensible to contemplate why Santander withdrew from the RBS branch purchase and reflect on how that might apply to the Verde deal.

As the crunch point approaches when Co-op must decide one way or another to complete or walk away from the deal and Peter Marks looks forward to his retirement, it would be good to have one last reflection on the deal and to decide whether he would rather be John Varley, who walked away from a bad deal with his reputation intact, or Fred Goodwin who was struck down by the winner's curse.

Update April 24th 2013.

So Peter Marks made the almost certainly right decision to walk away from the Verde deal. For the Co-op to have been burdened with the debt and enormous risks of the Verde deal would not have been a good leaving present.

However it does bring into question the future of financial services within the Co-op. Having sold the life and savings business to Royal London and with the general insurance business on the blocks a question has to be whether the Co-op should pull out of financial services altogether. The integration of Britannia into Co-op Financial Services has been a major challenge and it has not resulted in a real challenger to the Big 5 banks. The Co-op is at a crossroads and needs to decide whether financial services is really a business it can be successful in.