Showing posts with label Banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Banking. Show all posts

Wednesday, 21 January 2015

Why 2015 won't be the year of the challenger bank


When politicians and consumer finance champions talk about challenger banks they are looking for new players to eat into the 77% of the current account market and the 85% of the small business banking market that the Big 5 (Barclays, Lloyds, HSBC, RBS and Santander) currently have.

The figures from the Financial Conduct Authority for potential new banks could give the impression that 2015 could be the year that finally the Big 5 sees their market share being significantly reduced:

6 banking licences issued
4 banks proceeding through the application process
26 new banks being discussed

In addition there are already the likes of Nationwide, Co-op, TSB, Yorkshire Bank, Clydesdale Bank, Metro Bank, One Savings Bank, Handelsbanken, Aldermore, M&S Bank, Tesco Bank, Virgin Money and Shawbrook operating in the UK.

However on closer scrutiny the picture isn't quite as rosy and is unlikely to cause any executive from the Big 5 banks to lose any sleep.

The existing “challengers” broadly fall into one of four camps.

Camp 1: Existing established Players:

Nationwide

Co-op

Yorkshire Bank

Clydesdale Bank

Post Office (Bank of Ireland)

The established players have been operating current accounts in the UK market for many years, Nationwide being the newest of these to this specific market. Despite having been in the market for some time these established players’ impact on the market share of the Big 5 has been minimal. Nationwide is the most proactive in trying to acquire new customers within this group as is reflected by their being one of the biggest beneficiaries since the introduction of 7 Day Switching. Their market share is small but growing and its offering is something that clearly appeals to customers who do not like the Big 5 banks.

Camp 2: Banks created from former banks:

One Savings Bank (Kent Reliance Building Society)

TSB (Lloyds Banking Group)

Virgin Money (Northern Rock)

Williams & Glyn (RBS) – still to be launched

These are all banks that have (or will) relaunch themselves and have existing customers, branches and IT infrastructure. What this means is that in terms of offering a true alternative to the Big 5 banks they are limited by the legacy technology and cost bases they have inherited when they were set up. In the case of TSB and Williams & Glyn both of these were compulsory disposals by their parent banks following the 2008 financial crisis, however both of them have significant shareholdings by Lloyds Bank Group (TSB) and RBS (Williams & Glyn) so whether they can really be seen as challengers when they are still owned by one of the Big 5 is questionable.

One Savings Bank does not offer a current account and is focused on the specialty lending sector. Virgin Money does not currently market a current account.

Camp 3: Banks owned by larger organisations

Handelsbanken

Tesco Bank

M&S Bank

These three are each quite different.

Handelsbanken which has more than 175 branches in the UK has its parent company in Sweden. It is primarily focused on SME banking but does offer a personal current account. It is building a presence and has very high customer satisfaction but is still sufficiently subscale to not be a threat to the market share of the Big 5. However it is picking off customers that the Big 5 banks would rather not lose.

Tesco Bank has only relatively recently launched its current account so it is difficult to judge how successful it will be. With the size of the Tesco customer base and the insight it has into its customers from the Clubcard it has the potential to be a serious challenger however achieving sufficient scale will be beyond 2015. There is also a possibility with the woes of Tesco that the bank could be a candidate for disposal which could change significantly Tesco Bank’s market position.

M&S Bank while it does offer current accounts cannot be seen as a challenger as it is owned by HSBC, one of the Big 5 Banks. 

Camp 4: Greenfield challenger banks

Metro Bank

Aldermore

Shawcross

Atom Bank

Charter Savings Bank

Hampden & Co

These (and there are more) are the genuine upstarts the ones that are doing or planning to do something different in the market. The last three are still to launch. They are all primarily Private Equity funded.

Of those listed on Metro Bank offers a personal current account and Atom has a stated intention to offer one.

What each of these Greenfield challengers does not offer is scale and will certainly not bother the Big 5 banks in 2015.

Big 5 bank executives can sleep easy in 2015
When an examination is made across the four Camps as described above the inevitable conclusion is that while there may be some headlines and excitement about the number of potential challengers in and coming into the UK banking market there can be no doubt that in 2015 there will be very little dent in the current account market share of the Big 5 banks.

Wednesday, 19 November 2014

Why Big Data and analytics aren't the answer for banks

‘Big Data’ and ‘analytics’ are amongst the most over-used and abused terms currently in the business world. They are often sold as the panacea to all known problems by snake oil sellers across the globe. Banks should focus on true insights and consequential actions to differentiate themselves and take an industrial view to data and analytics.

Big Data and analytics have generated lots of revenue for hardware suppliers, software providers and consultants. They have also created lots of jobs for people with skills ranging from basic statistics to advanced mathematical modelling skills. What is highly questionable is whether all this expenditure has generated value for the banks that have invested in them?

Like many new business philosophies and technologies the approach banks have taken to adopting them is to build them in-house. Just like when computers first emerged and individual departments took it on themselves to buy their own computer, hire their own programmers and write their own code to address their department’s specific requirements (as an aside, It is one of the reasons why so many banks still today have such dysfunctional IT departments and systems), banks don’t appear to have learnt the lessons from the past and are adopting the same approach when it comes to data and analytics. Functions such as risk, mortgage underwriting, card product management, marketing, finance and treasury are creating their own local data marts, hiring their own data scientists and modellers and buying their own query and advanced analytics tools. They are building models, sometimes in inappropriate tools, with inadequate testing that the bank’s executives are making critical decisions based on the output from them.

The fact that individual departments are doing their own thing is very cost inefficient is the least of the problems with this approach. Even for banks that have elected to go for a Centre of Excellence operating model for data and analytics whereby a central pool of data and analytics experts provide services to whole bank there is a fundamental problem with this way of addressing data and analytics.

Building models in-house is predicated on the basis that every bank is so unique that the models will provide differentiation from the competition. However banking, and particularly retail banking, is based around standardised products with standardised ways of underwriting those products, standardised ways of funding the products and very largely standardised way of moving the customer’s money. Therefore spending large amounts of money hiring expensive data scientists and modellers and then lots of time building models when there are standard models available to either buy or pay for the use of from the likes of Experian, SAS and other data and analytics specialty firms makes no sense. Not least of all because true data scientists need to be continually fed interesting and challenging problems to crack (something few banks will be able to consistently provide enough of while specialty firms will be able to) otherwise they get bored and stressed – a bit like caged lions that are fed raw meat rather than having the excitement of the hunt.

Unfortunately the peddlers of Big Data and analytics solutions don’t point out to their customers and the IT users who buy their solutions don’t acknowledge the critical fact that:

Data and analytics without context and insight is of no value to a bank.

Insight is an unfortunate word because many banks take it to mean having a better understanding of what is going on inside their banks. However that is only the half of it. As critical is to have an understanding and the context of what is going on in the environment that the bank is operating within. What are the competitors doing, what is happening and could happen in the macro economic environment and how would that impact the bank’s customers are just some of the potential questions that need to be answered to create insight. If there had been a better understanding of some of these questions then it is possible that the financial crisis of 2008 could have been avoided.

However insight of its own is not enough. A number of banks across the globe could rightly claim that they have teams of data scientists who like the PreCogs in the Tom Cruise film ‘Minority Report’, who were able to predict crimes before they were carried out, know so much about their customers that they can predict what they will do next. However having that knowledge but not having a means of sharing it in a simple and usable way with the banks’ systems and the people who use those systems means that it is of no value at all.

Insight with the ability to know the ‘Next Best Action’ and execute on it is what will define the banks that will emerge as the winners.

This ability to apply data and insights to bring about great outcomes should not be limited to use with customers but should also be applied to other areas of the bank such as pricing models to allow personalised offers, to fraud detection, to identify money laundering activities and to make better funding decisions. The list of areas where this could be applied to banks is almost limitless.

However what it requires is a very different approach to data and analytics then is largely adopted today. It needs to be driven down by the desired business outcome with the data required being seen as the very last thing. It needs to be driven by the business executives not from IT or worst still technology vendors. It needs to be driven as an industrial process rather than as a cottage industry. Banks need to understand that where they will be able to differentiate themselves from their competitors is on their insights and how well they execute on those. For the rest they should look for best in class products and services for data and analytics from organisations that are truly expert in those areas.

Thursday, 30 October 2014

Why shared branches could be the answer to avoiding closing the last branch in town

Shared-branches(1).gif (300×160)
The announcement by Lloyds Banking Group that it would stop honouring the promise to not close the last branch in a town at the end of 2015 caused some furore amongst politicians and those representing rural communities. Lloyds having the largest number of branches of the major banks in the UK and partially owned by the tax payer has in many cases been left as the last branch in town as competitors have closed their branches knowing that Lloyds were obligated not to close theirs.

The response by Vince Cable, the UK Business Secretary, to the Lloyds announcement was to give all the major banks yet another rap across the knuckles in a sternly worded letter stating that this was unacceptable. However unacceptable it is what is the answer? While the banks may point to the many transaction services that the Post Office offers on behalf of the banks, a better answer is for the banks to get together and have shared branches for those villages and towns where they cannot justify the costs of having a single dedicated branded branch.

This joint branch would allow customers to perform transactions with their bank either with the help of a teller or by using self-service machines. If there is a teller then they would need to be trained in using each of the banks’ technology for the transactions covered by the branch. The simplest implementation would be for the branch to have one teller device for each brand sharing the branch and similarly for self-service machines, however this would have the disadvantage of requiring a larger branch than each of the individual branches will have required. The smarter option would be to have single devices which allowed the customer to say which brand they wanted to deal with when they first signed in and then the appropriate screens for that bank to appear. This would keep the size of the branch down.

The shared branch could include one or more meeting rooms where customers could meet with advisors from the appropriate bank by making an appointment in advance, allowing the opportunity for the advisor to service multiple branches and therefore maximising their productivity. The advisor would not even necessarily have to be physically in the branch but could converse with the customer via videoconferencing. This way a branch could remain open in low populated areas at a relatively low cost to each individual bank.

This service could even be provided by a third party or the local community under a different overarching brand.

This is not a new idea and is one that was first floated (by me amongst others) at least ten years ago. However that was at a time when the banks were making larger profits, there was less regulatory pressure and the technology to easily and cost effectively deliver these types of solution was neither mature nor available. While there was some initial interest from the major banks it was the idea of collaboration amongst the banks that was unthinkable even though it provided a benefit to the customer.

Maybe as the big 5 banks look to reduce their number of branches and rebuild their reputations this could be the right time to look to shared branches as a means of not being seen as the bank who closed the last branch in town.

Friday, 3 October 2014

The FCA is wrong to focus on account portability

The news that the FCA is to explore the move to full account portability as part of a review of current/checking account switching is disappointing as the FCA appears to be rushing to a solution without having really understood why customers are not switching their account providers at the levels that politicians and consumer lobbyists would like to see. The reason that these parties wish to see higher levels of switching is that they see this as an indicator of competition in the current account market which is dominated by the big five banks – Lloyds, Barclays, RBS, HSBC and Santander.

Customer switching has gone up by only 19% since 7 day switching was introduced

The FCA have been triggered into action by their disappointment at the low increase in the level of switching following the introduction of seven business day current account switching service introduced in October 2013. Despite the investment of $750m by the large banks in creating this guaranteed switching service levels of customer switching has gone up by only 19%.

The large banks have been the beneficiaries of switching

The irony is that the biggest beneficiaries of the account switching services have been Halifax (part of Lloyds Banking Group), Santander (one of the world’s largest banks), Nationwide Building Society and TSB (a Lloyds clone and still partially owned by the bank). With the exception of Nationwide, the account switching service has done little to change the market share of the major banks and even Nationwide has hardly changed the percentage.

The parallels between mobile phone numbers and account numbers are not valid

However for the FCA to jump to the conclusion that this is down to customers being reluctant to change their bank account number and therefore account portability will change this is both bizarre and illogical. Parallels are often made with the mobile phone industry where phone number portability has encouraged customers to switch between providers. However the use of phone numbers and bank account numbers are quite different. Whereas in order for telephone customers to be able to keep in contact with the hundreds and even thousands of people who have their number programmed into their phones keeping their mobile number when changing suppliers is essential the same cannot be said for bank account numbers.

Most bank customers have not memorised their bank account numbers. Once access to internet and mobile banking is set up a customer very rarely needs to know that number. When paying bills, transferring money, checking their balances, setting up or changing direct debits or standing orders there is no need for customers to know their bank account number. With the seven day switching services direct debits are transferred and guaranteed that if a problem occurs that the customer will be refunded for any charges occurred during the transfer process. With the increasing availability of P2P (Person to Person) mobile banking applications such as Pingit customers only need to know the mobile phone number of the person that they are transferring the money to (which is very likely to be stored in their phone) and don’t need to know the bank account details of the person that they are wanting to transfer money to. It is a fallacy to say that the reason people are not changing their bank accounts is because they don’t want to change their bank account number.

Customer interest in switching accounts is far lower than politicians and lobbyists

One of the primary reasons that is quoted despite the Seven Day Switching Service making it far easier for customers to switch current accounts is what politicians refer to as ‘customer apathy or inertia’. The reason that customers aren’t bothered is because for most customers banking really isn’t that interesting (until it goes wrong or they have a financial crisis), that the actual amount that they would save by switching from one bank to another is so minimal that it isn’t worth the effort and that they see one bank account much the same as another. To most customers banking services are a commodity and a largely undifferentiated one. They have better things to do with their lives than monitor whether one bank account is better than another.

There are significant numbers of providers of current accounts

The fact that the main beneficiaries of account switching have been the larger players is not because there is not a lot of choice in the market. Examples of organisations offering personal bank accounts include Nationwide Building Society, Tesco Bank, Marks & Spencer Bank, Metro Bank, Co-op Bank, Yorkshire Bank, Clydesdale Bank, Bank of Ireland (via the Post Office) and Handelsbanken.

The reason that Halifax, Santander, Nationwide, TSB and Metro Bank (though on a lot lower scale than the other four) have been successful in getting current account customers to switch to them is because of their attractive propositions whether it be paying interest on current account balances, discounts on utilities and other bills, convenience of branches or even offering dog biscuits. The fact that some of the most attractive propositions have come from the larger banks is because for most banks most personal current accounts are either loss leaders or have very low margins and therefore to be profitable in the current account market you need scale. That is very difficult and takes a lot of time to build from scratch as Metro Bank is finding.

Many of the so-called challenger banks e.g. Aldermore, Shawbrook, OneSavings Bank and Handelsbanken are not even attempting to engage in the personal current account market because of how unattractive it is financially. They would rather focus on the mortgage market or SME banking where the margins are higher and the cost to enter the market are far lower. As Virgin Money comes to the market it is based on the profits from mortgages and credit cards that the value will be attributed not current accounts.

The FCA is not focusing on the real issue

If the FCA is really interested in seeing greater competition in the current account market then rather than investigating a solution to a problem that doesn’t exist (customer only don’t switch because they don’t want to change their bank account number) then they should look at how to make it more attractive for the existing sub Big Five and new players to engage in the market with customer friendly banking propositions. It is only when there is significant differentiation between bank accounts in customers’ minds that switching volumes will become significant.

Wednesday, 17 September 2014

Where have all the global retail banks gone?

Where have all the global retail banks gone? The banks that had the ambition to become truly global retail banks. What happened to HSBC and ‘The World’s Local Bank’? (see HSBC goes back to its roots ) It isn’t only HSBC that has lost the appetite to be a global retail bank but also Citibank, Standard Chartered, Barclays and RBS amongst others have made it clear that they no longer have that aspiration. Each of them has and continues to be in the process of selling off or closing down selected retail banking operations across the globe.

So what made some of the largest banks in the world consider becoming a global retail bank?

Myth 1: Banking is the same all over the world

For a long time the myth has been actively peddled by consultants and banking applications salespeople that retail banking is the same the world over. After all a loan is a loan, a mortgage is a mortgage and a savings account is a savings account wherever they are in the world – aren’t they?

On the surface this appears to be true. The definition of a residential mortgage is fundamentally the same wherever you are in the world. However the process to take out that loan, the regulations that must be complied with and how the bank treats the mortgage asset is unique to each country. For example in the UK most loans are not securitised whereas in the US Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac play a role in almost every mortgage. The role that notaries play in the sales process in Spain is quite different from that which solicitors perform in the UK. Santander found this out to their cost when they replaced Abbey National’s banking platforms with Partenon, the Santander European retail banking platform. Significant parts of the banking platform had to customised to meet the different way that business is conducted in the UK compared to Spain. The ease with which Partenon could be implemented was a core part of the business case for the acquisition of Abbey by Santander. It turned out to be a lot more expensive and took a lot longer than envisaged.

 Likewise Bradford & Bingley and Barclays both found out separately that implementing a US mortgage application in the UK market was nigh on impossible with both writing off the complete cost of the implementation after many years and millions of pounds being spent trying to modify the applications to meet the local requirements. They had wanted to believe what the mortgage platform sales person had told them.

Both Citibank and HSBC decided to address the problem a different way by building their own custom global retail banking platforms. Neither of them succeeded in delivering a single core banking platform that has been rolled out to all their retail operations but hundreds of millions of pounds (if not billions) were spent trying to achieve that. Neither programme was completed.

As has previously been mentioned, Santander has come the closest to achieving this is. The Santander Partenon platform has been implemented for their European and parts of their US operations. For their South American operations Santander recognised that bending and force fitting Partenon was not going to be a viable option. Instead they needed to develop a different platform Altair but even this needs significant customisation for each new implementation.

Even when looking to implement in only one different country and with more modern architectures than HSBC, Citi or Santander were working with, one of the world’s largest platform vendors, SAP, has found it far more difficult and expensive to implement a core banking system than was envisaged as has been illustrated by the troubled programmes at Commonwealth Bank (Australia), Postbank (Germany) and Nationwide Building Society (UK). Commonwealth Bank has achieved the implementation and is now reaping the benefits (see CBA proves case for core banking replacement)  

Myth 2: Retail Banking is highly profitable

Politicians and consumer lobbyists across the world continue to complain that banks make excessive profits. When the total profit that the large banks make is looked at the numbers can seem very large but when you look at the margin being made it presents a very different picture. Retail banking is only really profitable when operated at scale. It is for a very good reason that in most countries the retail banking market is dominated by a small number of large banks. The costs of capital, of meeting global and local regulations, setting up branch and back office infrastructures, of putting in place the IT systems, of either creating or joining the payments infrastructure are huge. The risks and returns for large banks entering a new market and building a customer base from scratch are very unattractive. This and the myth below are two reasons why the large global banks have been selling or closing their operations in many countries – they simply didn’t have the scale and couldn’t see a way to get to the scale to make the business attractive.

Myth 3: Global brands matter to retail customers

The global banks that have entered local markets have been under the misapprehension that the power of their global brand would be sufficient to make local customers change their primary banking relationship to them. HSBC is the bank that spent the most money in trying to make this true with their ‘The World’s local bank’ campaign. Despite all that money being spent they discovered that it wasn’t true and have and are withdrawing from countries where they could not build enough scale. Citi discovered this to their cost in countries such as Spain, Germany, Poland and Turkey where they could not get local customers to move to them. (see Citi in Europe). The reality is that the majority of customers want to bank with local banks with all the perceived benefits of local and national regulation and the knowledge that the bank is not going to disappear if Head Office decides that the operation in that country is not making enough money.

What of the future of global retail banking?

So does all this mean the end of global retail banks? In terms of a Barclays UK customer walking into an Absa branch in Capetown and transacting as if they were a local customer or a Santander UK customer walking into a branch in Sao Paulo then that is not something that the banks are willing to invest in, nor do they see sufficient demand to justify it. In terms of banks having significant retail presences in other geographies then there won’t be too many banks that will do that – HSBC and Santander being the exceptions.

Santander stands out as the leader in global retail banking particularly given that it is a  Spanish bank where the profits from its retail bank in the UK exceed those of its local market. Despite the death of Emilio Botin it doesn’t appear that that strategy is going to change with Ana Botin fully supporting the direction he set with ambition to expand further globally particularly in the US and Poland.

Monday, 18 August 2014

CBA proves the case for core banking replacement

CBA (Commonwealth Bank of Australia) has delivered record profits of $8.6bn AUD (£4.8bn, $8.0bn USD) for the year to June 2014. With a return on equity of 18.7% (versus typically 5-7% for US/UK banks and less for European banks) and a cost:income ratio of 36% for the retail bank (42.9% for the bank overall), this puts CBA amongst the most profitable banks in the world. It is also one of the banks with the fastest growing profits. This is despite fees paid by customers going down. The profit is being driven a combination of growing the revenues outperforming their competition and by increases in productivity. The CEO, Ian Narev, is clear that a major factor in the high performance of the bank is due to the major investments in technology, including the replacement of their core banking platforms.

For many banks the idea of replacing the core banking platforms is the equivalent of performing a full heart and lungs transplant while running a marathon. However, whilst most banks have not had the courage to embark on such a challenging endeavour, in 2006 CBA decided to. CBA made the task even harder by rather than choosing to replace their old legacy systems with proven technology they chose to be one of a very few pioneers with the new SAP Banking platform that, at that point, was largely unproven.

CBA have not been risk averse in adopting new technologies. They were one of the first banks to outsource their internet banking infrastructure to Amazon Web Services (AWS). See CBA and Amazon

The journey to their new banking platforms was not straight forward, bumps were found along the way and the costs rose above original estimates but there were releases along the journey which released business benefits and they have succeeded in delivering a completely new set of platforms to drive their business from. This has given them significant competitive advantage.

One consequence of simplifying their IT landscape has been a dramatic decrease in the number of high impact system impacts from 400 in FY2007 to a mere 44 in FY14. Considering the number of major outages that some of its competitor banks have had and the damage to the brand this is a significant achievement. It will undoubtedly have contributed to why CBA is #1 for customer satisfaction amongst Australian banks.

Among the benefits that the bank and the customers have experienced is a dramatic reduction in the time it takes to get innovations into production – two recent examples of this are Lock & Limit (allowing customers to block and/or limit the size of transactions) and Cardless Cash (customers being able to withdraw from ATMs using their mobile phones) which came to market in May 2014 ahead of competitor offerings.

CBA has also seen a significant increase in self-service with the percentage of deposits completed via an Intelligent Deposit Machine going from 10% to 37% over a twelve month period. With the launch of online opening of accounts (savings and current accounts) customers can now open accounts in less than 60 seconds.

None of the big UK banks has embarked upon a core banking platform replacement programme. Lloyds has consolidated and simplified its systems based on the legacy TSB platform. Santander has a single platform, Partenon, which is based on a banking package but it is legacy technology.  HSBC embarked on developing a single system for the Group, One HSBC, but that programme was stopped after a number of year. Nationwide Building Society is some way down the journey of implementing SAP Banking and is beginning to see the benefits with reduced times to launch products and propositions.
One of the key architects and sponsors of the technology transformation programme at CBA was Michael Harte. He is shortly to take up the role of COO with responsibility for IT at Barclays. There can be little doubt that his experience at CBA was the major attraction for his recruitment. The benefits that CBA is reaping following this six plus years journey are clear to see. The question is with all the challenges that Barclays faces, the size of the investment and the length of the return on that investment, the decreasing margins in banking and the amount of work needed to keep up with the regulatory burden whether Barclays will have the appetite and the staying power to embark upon what can be a highly rewarding but hazardous journey

Wednesday, 6 August 2014

Creating competition in retail banking

With the recommendation by the UK CMA (Competition and Markets Authority) to conduct a review of competitiveness in the current account banking market, what are some of the areas that they may consider to increase competitiveness?

Breaking up the banks. This is the Labour party’s big idea - creating a set of competitor banks by splitting the big banks. The primary focus for this would be the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. However this isn’t a new idea and is already being tested with the creation of TSB from Lloyds Banking Group and Williams & Glyn’s from RBS. However already there are lessons to be learnt from this process.

While there was initial interest from a number of players the list of serious bidders rapidly shortened when the complexity, the capital required and the price being sought became clear. The initial two successful bidders the Co-op (Lloyds) and Santander (RBS) after lengthy negotiations and detailed planning withdrew their bids.

Separating the bank’s technology whether cloning (TSB) or migrating to a new platform is proving to be enormously complex and very expensive.

The payback period is very long and without the subsidy and support of the selling bank would be even longer. TSB for instance does not expect to break even for many years and that is despite being helped by Lloyds lending the new bank a book of loans.

While breaking up the banks will mean that there are more places to have a current account there is no guarantee that this will ensure better deals for customers, particularly given that the easiest option for the broken up banks is to be clones of the original banks just simply without the scale advantages. With little to differentiate them having more players in the market doesn’t result in real consumer benefit.

Creating a payments utility separate from the big banks. One of the often heard complaints from new entrants is that the big banks have an advantage because they own the payments infrastructure and the cost for new entrants to use that infrastructure is a barrier to entry. One option would be to create a separate payments utility not owned by the banks. However that does not mean that it will necessarily be cheaper for new entrants. For a start there is the cost of acquiring and separating the infrastructure from that of the banks that currently own it which would need to be paid by customers of the utility. There is also the question of how to charge for the use of this utility. The charge would need to reflect the significant cost of running, maintaining and investing in modernising the infrastructure – it is not simply the cost of using the infrastructure because otherwise what is the incentive for whoever ends up owning the infrastructure to invest in it to make it not only continually available but also suitable for new innovations as they come along? Commercial reality dictates that for banks with high transaction volumes that cost per transaction should be lower.

Portable bank account numbers. Many of the challenger banks are supportive of the concept of portable bank account numbers. They look at the mobile phone industry and see the way that customers can take their phone numbers with them. However before recommending this change the CMA needs to research just how big an inhibitor to switching bank accounts for customers is the change of account number. Given the Seven Day Switching Service where the banks guarantee no interruption to direct debits and standing orders and given the limited numbers of times customers actually have to know their account number in order to transact, would portable bank account numbers really open the floodgates of customers switching bank account numbers?

Ending ‘free when in credit’ banking. In the UK customers have got used to so-called ‘free banking’ where as long as a customer remains in credit, whilst they get little or nothing for the balance that they retain, they don’t pay charges. A number of the challenger banks have complained that this gives the incumbent banks an advantage as it is difficult (but not impossible) to compete on price and because it gives banks offering current accounts a distinct advantage over those who don’t in terms of the low cost of all those balances when it comes to lending. It will take a brave politician to move to compel the end of free banking. Of course to attain transparency then the cost of each transaction e.g. cost of an ATM withdrawal, the cost of paying in a cheque, the cost of a direct debit, etc, would need to be made clear to customers and, the challengers would argue, that that would enable customers to choose between banks. However looking at a market where this is the way banking is conducted, Australia, then not only is there a greater concentration of current accounts held with the Four Pillars (Nab, Westpac, CBA and ANZ) than with the equivalents in the UK, but Australian banks are amongst the most profitable retail banks in the world. Despite that there are not lots of new entrants fighting to get a slice of the pie. For customers Australia is also one of the most expensive countries to bank. It would appear that ending ‘free banking’ alone would not solve the perceived competition problem.

Set a maximum market share for current accounts. On paper this would appear to be the solution. The big banks could be given a period of time over which they must reduce their share of the market to for instance to no more than 15% of the market each leaving the challenger banks to fight over the remaining 40%. The banks would need to be told the mix of customers they must dispose of, just as Lloyds was instructed for the disposal of TSB. However what does this do for consumer choice? Not all customers were happy to be told that they were moving from Lloyds to TSB without an option. Given that the CMA investigation is about creating competition and making it easier for customers to switch banks this does not appear to be the solution.

Make it even easier for new challengers to enter the market. Measures have already been put in place to reduce the capital required, shorten the process and allow challenger banks time to grow into being a full scale bank. The benefits of this are already being seen with the likes of Atom Bank being announced. It is difficult to see what more could be done in this area.

Make retail banking more profitable to encourage more new entrants. There is little chance of this being one of the recommendations of the CMA. The reality is that with increased regulation, increased scrutiny and rising costs for compliance retail banking is becoming less and less attractive a sector for investors. As JC Flowers have recently remarked with Returns on Equity going from double to single digits there are more attractive sectors to look at investing in.

Is the CMA looking to solve a problem that customers don’t see as a priority? With the advent of Seven Day Switching the number of customers changing banks has risen – over one million customers have chosen to do that. The biggest beneficiaries have been TSB, Santander and Nationwide Building Society. There more than a handful of challenger banks out there – Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Metro Bank, Co-op Bank, Handelsbanken, Aldermore and others with current accounts on the way – amongst them Atom Bank and Virgin Money. Despite that the market share of the large high street banks hasn’t changed significantly. The question is why aren’t customers changing banks? Is it simply because they see banking as a utility, that each of the banks are pretty much the same, that for most customers (unlike bankers, politicians, financial journalists and consumer champions) banking doesn’t enter their consciousness unless they have a bad experience. In the grand scheme of things for most customers they have far more important issues to think about than whether they should switch their bank accounts.

Perhaps it is time that the CMA focused on something of more day to day importance to consumers.

Wednesday, 28 May 2014

New NAB CEO faces challenge of what to do with Yorkshire and Clydesdale Banks


With Cameron Clyne leaving National Australia to spend more time with his family, incoming Group CEO, Andrew Thorburn, will have to face the perennial question of what to do with the bank’s UK businesses. For many years Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank have been seen as albatrosses hanging around the neck of the incumbent Group CEO of National Australia. With Nab’s focus on growing in their domestic market and Asia the two banks have long been seen as non-strategic.

During the financial crisis Nab had to invest nearly £1.5bn of capital into the business to shore up the balance sheet. There have been challenges with non performing loans as well as redress for misselling of PPI to add to the woes. As part of a plan to improve the performance of the business there has been a significant cost cutting exercise that resulted in the removal of 1,400 jobs and the closure of 29 banking centres. There has also been a withdrawal from London and the south of England.
However for many years both banks have been starved of any significant investment to improve them and to make them better able to compete in the UK market. It is not since the Brit John Stewart was Group CEO and fellow Brit Lynne Peacock was running the UK operations that any significant effort was put into innovation and growing the businesses in the UK. Indeed large parts of the strategy for the UK banks set out by Stewart and Peacock were reversed during the cost cutting exercise. (Recent news that Clydesdale Bank is to issue Britain’s first plastic £5 note hardly counts as innovation).
Nab in Melbourne have for a long time been very open about the fact that Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank are seen as non-strategic. The market has been sounded out for interest in acquiring the business. At one point it was rumoured that Santander was interested in acquiring the business but no deal has emerged. A key on-going challenge for the Nab Group CEO has been that there has been a significant gap between the value that the UK operations are held on the balance sheet and the price potential acquirers are prepared to pay. This situation has deteriorated even further since the crisis in 2008 with both bank valuations dropping and the interest in acquiring banks disappearing. For Nab, either no  Group CEO wanted to take that write off on their watch or the Board wouldn’t let him.
There is no doubt that there has been and continues to be a lot of dissatisfaction from analysts and investors about the financial performance of Nab in its local domestic market. It is seen as the laggard of the Four Pillars. The challenge for Andrew Thorburn is to turn around that perception. Whilst the UK operations are definitely not the highest priority in terms of fixing the business they are seen both as a distraction and requiring significant capital that could be better deployed elsewhere.
So as Andrew Thorburn starts his role as CEO in August 2014, will he do something to resolve this issue and what are his options for the UK operations?
The ideal outcome for the new CEO would be to sell the UK operations and minimise the write off. The question though is who would want to buy them?
On paper Yorkshire Bank and Clydesdale Bank could be challenger banks. They both have strong brands with loyal customers. The Yorkshire brand stretches way beyond the county boundaries. Clydesdale is seen very much as a Scottish bank and one that has managed to maintain its reputation far better than either Royal Bank of Scotland or HBoS, its two main rivals. This could make it attractive to Private Equity firms, for instance JC Flowers might wish to merge it with its OneSavings Bank. It could also be attractive to other Private Equity firms looking to establish a foothold in the UK retail banking market. However the timing for One Savings Bank is not good as they have already announced that they are to float and that is where their focus in the short term will be.
The challenge for anyone evaluating Yorkshire and Clydesdale is, apart from their customer base, what is there of value to acquire? Between the Yorkshire and Clydesdale they have 322 branches, a very similar number to the branches that Williams & Glyn (the challenger bank being created from the forced disposal RBS has to make) will have. However, as is becoming increasingly apparent to both established and challenger banks, the use of branches by customers is declining and therefore the value of having an extensive network of branches is reducing. As both RBS and Lloyds found out finding buyers for their branches was not easy with both, respectively, Santander and Co-op withdrawing their offers after long protracted negotiations. The additional challenge with the Yorkshire and Clydesdale branches is that significant investment by the buyer would be required to bring the branches up to  a standard customers expect today due to the lack of investment by Nab over the last few years.
If a new entrant was looking to acquire the Nab UK operations and they wanted to initially use the Nab IT platforms then if they wish to be competitive they would need to invest very heavily over the medium term on new platforms, as the Nab platforms are old and in need of retiring.
With a cost income ratio of 76% there is a lot of efficiency gains to be driven out by the right owner, but the question is the level of investment to achieve this and over what time period.
Given the level of investment that any new entrant would need to make in order to use the UK operations as a platform for competing in the UK retail banking market, the price that they would be prepared to offer is highly unlikely to meet the amount sitting on the Nab balance sheet.
Given Nab’s situation it is easy to understand why a couple of years ago Santander were rumoured to be interested in acquiring the UK operations. Santander has its own platform, Partnenon, and has a track record of being able to migrate bank accounts onto its systems – Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester and Bradford & Bingley. The challenge for Nab is that Santander is a distress purchaser and never knowingly overpays.
If Nab can’t sell Yorkshire and Clydesdale at an acceptable price then what about a flotation? Timing is a real challenge here as there has never been a time when more banks are coming onto the market. TSB, Aldermore, OneSavings Bank,William & Glyn, Virgin Money, Metro and Shawbrook have all announced intentions to come to the market over the next eighteen months. Investors are spoilt for choice. Along with the recent disappointing flotations (Saga, JustEat. AO, etc), albeit in other sectors, there will be a downward pressure on prices and consequently the amount of capital that will be raised.
Another option is to do nothing and let the two brands continue to operate as they are today, continue to reduce costs and improve performance with minimal investment and allow the business to slowly decline as customers move away to competitors when they are attracted by better offers.
There is no immediate need for Andrew Thorburn to make a decision about the future of the UK operations particularly given the uncertainty with the Scottish Referendum occurring in September 2014. The UK operations operate under a Scottish banking licence and a ‘Yes’ vote could create a long period of uncertainty and have a significant impact on the value of the UK operations.
However as a new CEO there is a grace period during which there is an opportunity as the new broom to look with fresh eyes at all the problems. It is an opportunity to announce write offs, set the bar and expectations low and then over-perform. Thorburn should take full advantage of this initial period of goodwill to be quite clear what his plan is for Yorkshire and Clydesdale to end the uncertainty for customers, colleagues and investors.

Friday, 16 May 2014

RBS forced to sell Citizens ending the most successful UK retail banking foray into US market

British businesses don’t have a great track record in breaking into the US retail market. You only have to look at the disastrous foray that the Marks & Spencer acquisition of Brooks Brothers was, Tesco’s humiliating and expensive attempt with the Fresh & Easy brand and, most recently, the failure of Yo Sushi! to realise how difficult it is for firms with strong brands in their domestic markets to make it across the pond.

The retail banking track record is no better with Barclays, Lloyds and Natwest all quitting the US in the late 1980s and 1990s. Losses from the acquisition of Crocker drove Midland Bank into the arms of HSBC. Even HSBC has not been immune to the problem with the disastrous acquisition of subprime Household continuing to hurt the bank to this day.

It is quite ironic then that RBSG is being forced to exit the one reasonably successful move into retail and commercial banking that British banks have made in the US. Whilst Fred Goodwin, the former CEO of RBSG, has been criticised for much of the way that he ran the global banking group (particularly paying over the odds for ABN Amro just as the wholesale markets were closing down) his strategy for building a presence in the US retail and commercial banking sector should be heralded as one his smarter moves.

Rather than trying to take on the large US retail banks where they were, at that time, competing aggressively with each other in New York, California, Texas and Florida, Goodwin decided to build his beachhead in the Mid-Atlantic by the acquisition of Citizens Financial Group. A series of small but strategically significant acquisitions followed that expanded it into New England and the Midwest. Citizens is now the 15th largest commercial banking organisation in the US. Whilst there have been challenges including writedowns following the acquisition of Charter One and recent issues with the way that capital is planned, overall Citizens is a highly capitalised and profitable bank. Yes its capital is under deployed but that is addressable. Indeed its reputation with its customers is far better than RBS’ in its own domestic market.

It is a great shame then for RBSG that due to having to take state intervention and becoming largely nationalised, primarily due to the acquisition of ABN Amro and the disastrous business in Ireland, that RBSG is being forced by the EU to dispose of its ownership of Citizens by the end of 2016.

As the first step of moving towards this in January 2014 Citizens sold off 103 branches in the Chicago area to US Bancorp.

 It has been announced that the next step will be to float or sell 20-25% of its share of Citizens. A flotation is more likely as there have been few signs of interest from potential buyers. However for Canadian, Japanese or Spanish banks that want to significantly grow their presence particularly in the Midwest and given that it is a forced sale it could be an interesting opportunity.

The flotation will help to rebuild its balance sheet, but the sale is what is really needed as that could release more than $3bn of capital, which would help RBSG reduce the government holding in the bank.

This is all a sad ending to what could have been had RBSG scaled back its ambition to be global investment bank.

As a footnote, British banks should not give up on being able to build a presence in the US retail and commercial banking market. RBSG has shown that it can be done. Barclays is having success with its Barclaycard US operation building scale to take on the other cards providers, however this is a monoline not a full service retail banking offering.

The British banks can also look to the Spanish banks, Santander and BBVA which with respectively the acquisition of Sovereign Bank and Compass Bank, are demonstrating that it is possible for Europeans banks to build a presence in the US retail banking market. It takes time, patience and recognition that whilst both the US and European markets have the words ‘retail banking’ in their names that they are quite different.

Thursday, 24 April 2014

The challenges facing the next RBS CIO

With the news that Mike Errington, CIO of RBSG, is retiring the bank will be looking for a replacement. The new CIO will have an overflowing inbox, so for those considering taking on the role what are some of the challenges that he or she will have to face?

The immediate on-going work is to ensure the stability of the existing systems. Having had a number of serious, customer-impacting outages over the last few years (including a problem with Ulster Bank ATMs on the day this was written), the work of applying patches to and building resilience into both hardware and software needs to continue. RBS is not the only bank that in earlier times avoided doing maintenance as a way of saving costs and subsequently is feeling the impact of doing that in terms of reliability of systems.

The second tactical exercise is the simplification of the IT infrastructure. However this is far easier said than done as the IT systems have evolved over many decades, creating great complexity and the number of people who understand the older systems and how they interrelate is rapidly declining both as the result of retirement and cost cutting within the bank. Simplification is about retiring and rationalising systems and infrastructure. Given the complexity that exists this is alike disarming a booby-trapped Second World War bomb requiring both high levels of skills and nerves of steel.

Both of these steps are akin to re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic, given the ages of the systems. There is no doubt that there has been significant underinvestment in IT since way before the RBS/Natwest integration. Whoever is the new CIO they should use the opportunity of as part of their taking the role to negotiate a commitment to a wholesale replacement of the core retail banking system as the likes of CBA (Commonwealth Bank of Australia), Nationwide Building Society and Deutsche Bank have carried out. However this would involve spending measured in the low to mid billions of pounds and a programme taking 3-5 years to execute. This is where making such an essential change becomes particularly difficult specifically for RBS as RBS is not just any bank, it is a state-owned bank. Such is the political pressure to see the bank returned profitably to the private sector and within the first couple of years of the next government i.e. almost certainly by the end of 2018, that it is highly unlikely that the funding for such a major investment programme will get approval from the key shareholder. However that is what both the CIO and the CEO should be looking for if RBS is to once again become a truly competitive UK bank.

There are however other major transformation programmes that the new CIO will have to pick up, drive and deliver.

Having negotiated an extension of the deadline to the end of 2016 for the disposal of the 308 branches that RBS was forced by the EU to sell as a result of receiving state aid, creating a separate clone of the RBS systems for the new Williams & Glyn’s bank to run on is another top priority for the new CIO. This is not dissimilar to the exercise that Lloyds Banking Group had to perform to create the platform for TSB to run on. However the Lloyds Banking Group platforms were in a far better state than the RBS systems benefitting from coming on the back of creating a single set of systems for the Lloyds TSB/HBoS merger. Even having that advantage for Lloyds Banking Group creating the separate TSB platform was not simple or easy with the eventual cost being in the order of £2bn. Delivering the William and Glyn’s separation to the 2016 deadline will be a major achievement.

This is not the only separation programme that the CIO will have to oversee. The IPO of the Citizens business in the US in Q4 2014 and the complete disposal by the end of 2016 will also need to be executed. This will entail the disengaging of Citizens from the Group systems.

In addition there is the question of what to do with Ulster Bank. The preferred option is to dispose of it by selling it to one of the challenger Irish banks e.g. Permanent TSB, Danske Bank. If that is to go ahead then the new CIO will have to look at the separation of Ulster Bank from the Group systems and supporting the clone until it is integrated into the buyers' systems.

One of the core strategies of RBSG is to scale back the investment bank, reducing costs to be aligned with the smaller bank and to return the bank to be more focused on the UK and supporting UK businesses. This will inevitably require changes to the investment banking platforms as businesses are closed or sold off. To achieve the reduction in costs and the required flexibility as volume drops will almost inevitably mean looking at further outsourcing of platforms and operations to third parties.

On top of the RBSG specific initiatives the new CIO will also face the plethora of transformation programmes and projects that will need to be implemented as a result of regulatory changes. One of the core ones will be the implementation of ring-fencing once that is fully defined. This will mean a significant change in the governance of RBSG and there is a question as to whether the role of Group CIO can persist under the new rules, requiring in a significant restructuring of Group Operations.

All of this will need to be delivered whilst digital, mobile and the use of data analytics for both competitive advantage and risk management continue to move at pace in an increasingly competitive banking market.

The new RBS CIO will need to face up to this hugely challenging environment all within the constraints of  a bank operating very much in the public spotlight, with the need to rebuild trust and the financial constraints imposed by  having the government as the largest shareholder. Only the bravest should apply.

 

 

 

Thursday, 20 February 2014

Challengers salami slice away at established banks dominance

The news that Paragon Bank (with an initial capital of only £12.5m) has become only the second new bank to be launched in the last one hundred years (Metro Bank being the first one), the first one to be authorised by the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) and to take advantage of the move by the regulator to simplify the process of setting up a new bank, is hardly going to have banks such as Barclays, Lloyds and RBS quaking in their boots. But is this just one more step in a trend that the big banks cannot afford to be complacent about?

The primary reason that Paragon has decided to apply for a banking licence is not so it can take on the established banks with a full offering of consumer current accounts and mortgages. It is so that it can take consumer deposits as a means of funding loans for the existing Paragon Group business. With interest rates low but expected to rise this should mean a lower cost of capital for the loans that they make than going into the wholesale market. With the experience that Richard Doe, the former ING Direct UK Chief Executive, brings from his former employer the new bank should be a success in competing for deposit balances. The low cost direct model for deposits has already been proven by the likes of the now defunct Egg and ING Direct. Whilst the press release from Paragon may talk about offering loans and asset finance it is clear from the recruitment of Richard Doe that the new bank will be initially focussed on raising the all important deposits.

Paragon Mortgages specialises in the Buy To Let (BTL) market for the residential market and has been very successful at this surviving during the crisis where the likes of Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & Leicester failed. It is this focus on a specific customer segment that gives it the advantage over the Big Five UK banks - Barclays, RBS, Lloyds, HSBC and Santander. It has taken the opportunity to build deep expetise in Buy To Let and are front of mind for mortgage brokers looking to play BTL business.

Competition in the BTL sector was decimated following the financial crisis with many small players and building players going out of business. However competition is picking up again with all of the Big Five, Nationwide and some of the other building societies increasingly attracted by the bigger margins that the Buy To Let market attracts over owner-occupied residential mortgages. Paragon is, to many extents, the incumbent that the other banks have to shake. It should still be able to succeed in this market because it isn't just another business for them it is the only business segment they are in. Paragon does not have the cost of running expensive branch networks distributing either directly or via brokers. As long as they can continue to excel in the service they provide to brokers and to landlords they should be able to continue to punch above their weights against the larger generalist players.

While the politicians champion the idea of a few large challenger banks coming into the market to take on the Big Five banks and reduce their market shares in deposits, current accounts and lending, with the Labour Party suggesting that they will break the banks up should they come into power, a different reality is going on in the market. The likes of TSB (still owned by Lloyds Banking Group but due to float), William & Glynn's (owned by RBSG and, again, due to float) and Tesco Bank attract the most attention from politicians and the media, but in the background smaller niche players have quietly gone about picking off rich segments of the traditional banks market share.

Handelsbanken with its 170 branches, largely in market towns, has targetted SME customers and private customers with above average earnings who appreciate having a local branch with a local manager who is empowered to make decisions rather than leaving it to the computer or Head Office has quietly gone about building a sizeable, highly profitable and satisfied customer base. Aldermore launched in 2009 focussed on SME customers has lent more than £3bn pounds. Metro Bank has focussed on customers in urban areas that like both visiting branches and having extended hours. There are other focussed challengers either already out there or preparing to launch.

Competition to the dominant banks from challenger banks is already here, it may not always be head on and obvious but rather by quietly salami slicing away the better, more profitable cuts from the market share of the established players, while the big banks are left with less desirable segments. It is for this reason the launch of Paragon Bank should be welcomed as just one more step forward towards a more competitive banking market.

Saturday, 11 January 2014

Removing incentives won't stop bank mis-selling


The news that Lloyds Banking Group has been fined £28m ($46m) by Britain’s FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) for having a bonus scheme that put pressure on sales staff to mis-sell products once again brings the spotlight to bear on the culture of banks and specifically, in this case, retail banks.  In Lloyds’ case it was not only the benefits of meeting or achieving targets that created inappropriate behaviour but the sanctions for missing targets including demotion and base salary reduction that put staff under pressure. For at least one sales person they felt under such pressure not to fail that they inappropriately sold products that they could not afford to themselves and their family as well as their colleagues.

The typical media and political response to incidents such as this is to suggest that incentives are bad, that remuneration shouldn’t be related to achieving targets as incentives lead to the wrong sets of behaviours.

However simply removing the explicit link between sales performance and pay will not remove the pressure to achieve sales targets.

The pressure comes right from the top. While the new CEOs of banks may publicly talk about changing the culture of banks, putting the customer at the heart of the bank, winning through providing a differentiated service and they may be completely sincere in those sentiments, by the time that that message is passed down through the organisation to the sales people at the frontline it will be measured in terms of targets, which will need to be achieved. Anglo Saxon businesses are run with a performance management culture where achieving or exceeding targets and  giving greater rewards to those who meet those targets than those who don’t  is fundamental to how those businesses operate. While it may never have been the intention of Antonio Horta-Osario, CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, that the staff be put under such pressure that they coerced customers into buying products that they did not need, by the CEO setting his or her direct reports stretch targets that was the almost inevitable consequence.

The reason for this is simple: banks are commercial businesses that have investors who are looking for returns and always have the option to invest their money elsewhere if the return is better. As such CEOs of banks are competing for investment and are accountable to their shareholders. This applies as much to new entrants and challenger banks as it does to the established banks. All of the new entrant banks without exception have investors backing them whether it is parent companies such as retailers, hedge funds, Private Equity funds or individual wealthy investors. Even the building societies and mutual have to look to the external market for capital and those who lend capital have options as to where they lend to and are doing to achieve competitive return.

But is a culture that is about beating the competition, about achieving the best that you can for your organisation really such a bad thing? Certainly the impression that many politicians gives is that yes it is. The sentiments being expressed have strong parallels with the period where some schools banned competitive sports because politicians believed they were harmful to children.  It wasn’t good for children because it meant that some of them would have to experience losing.

The politicians who rally against the banks and banker compensation schemes can’t have it both ways. On the one hand they say don’t want those in banks to be incentivised to sell customers products but on the other hand they want competition. Competition by its very nature requires a level of aggression, it requires you to play to win and for your opponents to lose.

To demonstrate that they are not solely focussed on financial outcomes most banks today use a balanced set of financial and non-financial measures to monitor the performance of the bank and their employees.   Typical non-financial measures include Net Promoter Score (NPS), customer satisfaction, numbers of complaints and staff engagement.  The argument being that by having a balanced set of measures sales staff are incentivised to treat customers fairly and to only sell customers what they need.

Some banks such as Barclays and HSBC have removed all financial incentives for their staff to sell customers products. Instead their staff are paid a basic salary with the ability to share in a bonus depending on the performance of the bank. However, even when that is the case, every customer facing bank employee who has responsibility for helping a customer to apply for a mortgage or open a savings account knows that, at the end of the day, when it comes to the annual performance review whether they have achieved or missed their financial targets will always be more important than whether they have achieved their non-financial ones. They know that their opportunity to receive a pay rise, to get a bonus or to progress their careers is dependent upon their ability to deliver profits for their bank. The financial incentive may not be explicit but it is still there.

There exceptions to this.  A bank that has taken a very different approach is Handelsbanken. At this bank if the profitability exceeds the average rate of its peers, then surplus profits are put into a fund and distributed to all the staff. However they can only receive these accumulated benefits when they turn 60, thus encouraging long-term thinking and loyalty. The staff, including the executives, have flat salaries with no bonuses. There are no sales or market share targets. Handelsbanken has very high customer satisfaction and is highly profitable. The bank has had no problems with mis-selling or wrongdoing.

However this model will not suit everybody. This is very much a Scandinavian model and the pace of growth whilst highly profitable will not be attractive to all investors. Detractors of this approach will argue that no highly talented executive would be attracted by this reward model when there are banks across the globe prepared to reward more in the short term. The sustained excellent results that Handelsbanken have delivered speak for themselves.  Handelsbanken  would probably argue that it has no desire to attract the sort of executives who are interested in only the short term and will move from bank to bank simply for better rewards.

Given that the reality is the Handelsbanken model cannot and should not be imposed upon all banks, what is the answer and how can this type of mis-selling be avoided in the future?

The reality is that it will never be totally eliminated. Indeed if there were never any complaints or if there were never any practices that could be open to question it would suggest that the hunger to be the best, the passion to grow the business was missing. Every sportsman who wants to be the best knows that you have to go the edge to succeed.   There will always be employees who are too aggressive or dishonest. It is that they are identified and the way that they are handled that sends out the signal to their fellow employees as to what is acceptable behaviour. That has to be called out loud and clear and demonstrated by actions from the top of the organisation.

Secondly, while many banks operate a balanced scorecard of financial and non-financial metrics to measure the performance of the bank, the financial rewards need to be truly aligned to that Scorecard and not just to the bottom line. Not only must reward be aligned to the scorecard it needs to be seen to be aligned. This means that for instance if customer satisfaction or employee engagement scores are part of that scorecard and those measures are not met or regulators impose fines despite financial targets being met, that the executives’ rewards are significantly financially reduced. This is something that has not been reflected across the banking industry despite the enormous financial fines handed out to the likes of JP Morgan and Barclays.

Thirdly there needs to be a recognition by investors that the days of retail banks being a licence to print cash are over, that most banks need significant investment both in terms of capital to fund the business but also to provide the infrastructure that a bank needs to have to compete in the 21st century and finally that an investment in a bank is for the long term – measured in double digit years.

Changing the culture of retail banks is not as easy as simply removing incentives, neither it is something that can be done overnight. To have a vibrant and competitive banking industry there needs to be some friction and a world without it will be a lot worse for the consumer.