Showing posts with label HBOS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label HBOS. Show all posts

Sunday, 11 August 2013

Who should buy the RBS branches?

On the face of it the Lloyds Banking Group's and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group's forced disposal of their branches look quite alike. Even the numbers of branches being disposed of, in a dyselexic way, are the same 631 and 316 respectively. Both were imposed by the European Union as a result of state intervention. to save the banks brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. Both Groups have struggled to find buyers for their branches. Both banks have had potential buyers walk away from their deal late in the day - the Co-op in the case of Lloyds Banking Group and Santander in the case of Royal Bank of Scotland Group. Both are now pursuing floatation of the severed entities due to a lack of interest from potential buyers.

However fundamentally the offerings for potential buyers are different and therefore the people and organisations that should seriously consider and be considered for the acquisitions are quite different.

The reason that Lloyds Banking Group have been instructed to sell 631 branches and their associated customers is because, following their arms being severely twisted by the Government to save HBoS by acquiring it, LBG was left with a very dominant market position in unsecured lending, mortgage and current accounts for consumers whilst being underpinned by government support.

For RBSG selling their 361 branches was both due to the level of government support that required to save them from their self-created problem and their overwhelming dominance of the SME market segment. Thus the customers that RBSG is selling are small and medium sized business customers.

Some might say that retail and SME banking are not that different. Indeed that debate has been running for decades with banks periodically changing where SME banking sits in their organisation between within the retail and within the corporate bank. Business Banking has not sat comfortably in either organisation being neither fish or fowl.

As is being evidenced by Santander in its results, Business Banking is nowhere near as straightforward as retail banking and requires significantly more capital for every loan. Santander who is one of the few banks that has been able to build a global retail banking platform (that has enabled to make numerous successful acquistions across the globe) has found it very challenging to bend their Partenon banking platform to support UK Business Banking customers needs. Indeed it was IT issues that were cited by Santander as the reason that the acquisition of the RBSG branches was halted.

The difference from retail banking extend way beyond just capital and technology and into the most important part of banking - the people who work in it and the skills and competencies they require. It is not impossible to move from retail banking to SME banking, but  it requires a different mindset and different skills.

Another difference between the LBG and the RBSG disposals is the condition of the IT systems. Lloyds Banking Group has, as a result of the acquisition of HBoS and the need to fundamentally reduce costs, been through an exercise of migration and simplification of banking systems. The starting point, the TSB systems, were newer and better designed than either Lloyds Bank, RBS or Natwest systems, so provided LBG with a far better starting position than RBSG finds itself in. The problems that RBSG has had with its banking platforms over the last few years are well documented and have been very obvious to their customers.

Whoever acquires or enters into a joint venture with RBSG needs to recognise that they will need to partner with RBSG IT for at least the next five years as it is very unlikely that moving onto a new platform and separating from the old one could be achieved any faster than that. This means that the acquirer's business will be dependent upon RBSG being able to provide IT services to keep their business going. This was clearly something that Santander found to be unpalatable.

This raises the question of who should acquire RBSG's branches? Given that the deals risks are already high (amount of capital, market risk, IT risk), then when RBSG considers who to partner with then a consideration has to be which of the potential buyers reduces the deal risk the most whilst still offering an attractive commerical proposition. One of the key ways to reduce the risk is to sell to a buyer who fundamentally understands and has a proven track record in SME banking.

Anacap who's bid is led by Alan Hughes the former First Direct (a retail bank) boss also owns Aldermore the UK banks that focuses solely on SME banking. Anacap has the experience of setting up a new SME bank, putting in new platforms and writing profitable business. This has to count for a lot.

The Standard Life bid (teamed with Corsair Capital and Centrebridge) is being led by John Maltby the former head of SME Banking (and Kensington Mortgages the buy-to-let specialist) at Lloyds Banking Group. This consortium also has the backing of the Church Commissioners, though whether this suggests any divine preference is doubtful.

Finally there is the consortium led by Andy Higginson the former Tesco Finance Director who has experience of working with RBSG when he was involved in the launch of Tesco Personal Finance.

Competition in the SME banking market has changed since 2008 when the EU decision to force RBSG to dispose of market share with the increasing presence of Santander, Aldermore and Handelsbanken, it is a very different market with different regulatory requirements.

So for whoever decides to buy the RBSG branches the latin expression could not be more appropriate - caveat emptor!

Monday, 27 May 2013

Why the Co-op is right to stop new commercial lending




Commercial lending has been a significant contributor to the downfall of a number of financial services organisations. This was the primary reason that HBoS failed and subsequently took Lloyds Banking Group down with it. It was also the principle cause of the failure of Bradford & Bingley who made a major play into the buy-to-let market. Alliance & Leicester kept out of that market until the temptation of high margins and growth became too great to resist and paid the ultimate price by, like Bradford & Bingley, having to be 'rescued' by Santander. Britannia Building Society, which the Co-op acquired, aggressively entered the commercial lending market prior to its acquistion. Indeed it is the size and the problems within the Britannia Building Society commercial lending book that has fundamentally caused the huge capital gap and the down grading of the Co-op's credit rating.

A question has to be why so many safe building societies/mutuals have been tempted into commercial lending and got it so wrong?

There is no doubt that in the good times that commercial lending is highly attractive with guaranteed rents and better margins than for residential lending. The size of deals are far larger than for residential lending and for those who are motivated by numbers signing a deal measured in millions rather than hundreds of thousands is very attractive.

There is also no doubt that market for commercial lending is very much more volatile than for residential lending. Up until 2008 it was always the perceived belief that the only direction for residential housing prices to go was up - the expression 'as safe as houses' was for good reason.

The residential housing market is also more homogenous than commercial lending. Commercial lending has a wide variety of segments such as hotels, offices, retail and industrial. These segments operate in different ways, have different cycles and require specialist knowledge.

Commercial lending requires high amounts of capital, has a far broader range of risks than residential lending and requires having a large diversified portfolio to be successful in the long term.

For residential lending there is a lot of data about the market available, the amount of capital for each individual deal is a lot less, there is a huge amount of historical data, so making fact based decisions is relatively straigh forward.

The same cannot be said for commercial lending. What is critical for success in commercial lending is both internal and external data on what is going on in the market. This includes knowing and understanding what the competitors are doing. If a bank is winning all the commercial lending deals and others are withdrawing from the market then the executive need to be asking why. A question is whether the banks that failed had the data and the analytics in place and, if so, why they didn't respond to it?

For many years banks have wrestled with the decision of whether SME banking sits with the retail bank or the commercial and corporate bank. At least one lesson that should be taken from the financial crisis is that the skills, knowledge and understanding that is required to lend to consumers and the mass market is quite different from those to lend to businesses. To move from retail to commercial lending is not a continuum but to move into a totally different business. It appears that the new CEO of the Co-op gets this and has wisely decided that commercial lending is a step too far. The question outstanding is still whether the Co-op should be in banking at all?

Tuesday, 18 September 2012

The end of the Retail experiment in Retail Banking?






With the announcement that Joe Garner, CEO of HSBC's UK retail bank and First Direct, will leave the bank early next year, following in the footsteps of Deanne Oppenheimer (Barclays), Andy Hornby (HBoS) and Helen Weir (Lloyds Banking Group)  the era of  former retailers running UK banks appears to have come to end.

The recognition that Retail Banking had lessons to learn from the retail industry was really born with the launch in 2000 of the 'Occasio' branches by Washington Mutual under Deanne Oppenheimer's leadership. These were completely novel bank branches with the screens between the tellers and the customers removed, bright open spaces which looked much more like a retail outlet than a branch. They even included areas with toys for children to play with while the parent took out a mortgage or a loan.

This concept of moving from 'branches' to 'stores' took off across the world. Abbey National (now part of Santander) openend up branches co-located with Costa Coffee outlets The thinking being that when a customer popped in for their cappuccino they might just take out a loan or open a savings account.

This model was taken even further in one bank in Puerto Rico where bank tellers were expected to take their turn operating as a barista in their branches handing out bank-branded coffees.

In Australia this concept took a uniquely Australian twist with one bank offering to wax your surf board while you did your banking.

Behind all of these radical changes to the design of  bank branches was the core retailing philosophy of the importance of footfall i.e. increasing the number of customers in the branch. The thinking behind this was that if there were more customers in a branch then this would increase sales, which is certainly true in retail.

However whilst having a coffee shop in a book store may have sold more books, with the Abbey National Costa branches it would appear that it was the sale of coffee that went up more than that of financial products.

One of the retail concepts that Joe Garner has brought to HSBC is the January Sale. For the last few years at HSBC branches loans have been offered at special deals and branches have had signs in the windows advertising the January sale. Again this is all about increasing footfall to increase product sales. In retail the usual reason for the January sales is to make room for new stock by selling off old stock at a discounted price rather than having to write off the value of the stock. That concept does not exist in retail banking. There are no old mortgages or old personal loans that are sitting around in the banks taking up branch space. Equally while in retail the January sales can result in impulse buys a loan or a mortgage is not and, never should be, an impluse purchase.

Meanwhile in The Netherlands the idea of making financial services products more physical was taken up. With one Dutch bank when a customer took out a loan they would leave the branch with a smart looking box. Quite what was in the box and what the customer would do with this 'physical' loan is still a mystery. Needless to say this experiment was quietly dropped.

Another concept that has been introduced into HSBC branches is HSBC Radio. Again this is a concept brought in from retail. Fashion shops such as Top Shop have for some time had their own radio stations both to improve and extend the shopping experience as well as increasing basket size. However the reality is that retail banking customers do not want to spend any longer than they possibly can in a branch. While they are queuing to pay in cheques running adverts for loans and mortgages is no more likely to create an impluse purchase than the January sales.

A concept brought from the white goods retail sector of heavily discounting the cost of appliances such as televisions, fridges and washing machines and then making up for the discount by selling highly profitable extended warranties was brought to the retail banking sector at the height of the credit boom in the form of low interest personal loans, credit cards and mortgages along with PPI (Payment Protection Insurance). In many cases the interest rate of personal loans was below cost (due to the high wholesale loan interest rates driven up by the excess demand over supply) making it essential for the banks to sell PPI in order to make a profit.

Finally introducing the retail compensation model of low basic salaries with commission based on sales targets including large incentives to beat targets into the retail banking sector has been key to the misselling of products to customers.

There is no doubt that the way branches looked and operated needed to change. Certainly a lot of the branches today are far more attractive and appealing places than they were before the injection of retail experienced executives into the banks.

However it would appear that the retail experiment is largely over. When Chase took over Washington Mutual  it took a conscious decision to refit the Occasio stores and make them look more like traditional branches.Underpinning Chase's decision was the reality of who the users of branches are today. With the exponential increase in the use of smart phones and other ways of connecting with the internet the vast majority of personal customers do not visit branches on a regular basis. Most personal customers will not either remortgage or take out a new mortgage more than once very three years (and increasingly longer than that), therefore their need to visit a branch (and even here increasingly mortgages are taken out online) is almost never. The users of branches today tend to be small businesses and private banking customers. The open style of branches with the bank private radio playing does not work for either of those segments of customers. Those customers want, and need, a difference experience.

The last 10-15 years has seen the injection of retailing ideas into retail banking. It has had some benefits for customers, but also has had some serious downsides. What we are now seeing is a recognition that banking has always been about servicing, and focusing on the total customer experience across all possible points of contacts is the most important way to retain customers and build loyalty. It is also clear that there are industries other than retailing that excel at delivering a great customer experience that banking should learn the lessons from.

Monday, 12 March 2012

Why the culture of banks has to change



With the FSA (Financial Services Authority) report on what went wrong at HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) before the bank had to be rescued by the UK Government and Lloyds TSB clearly showing that the issue was one of governance, there has never been a time when the need to change the culture of the banks has been clearer or more urgent.

The FSA report demonstrates that the corporate lending division of HBOS had a far riskier book than any of the other UK banks. HBOS continued to win deals in both the commercial and retail property markets in the UK, Ireland and Australia at lower margins and higher risks at a time when all the other banks were reducing their exposure to the sector or no longer pursuing new business. HBOS proudly proclaimed their success and growth in the market, not recognising that they alone were doing this. It doesn't appear to have crossed the minds of the executive that they were winning business that no one else wanted, or at least no one wanted at the rates that HBOS were offering. When the Head of the division proposed a growth of 10-12% in commercial lending not only was this not challenged he was told by the CEO of HBOS that this needed to be increased to 22%.

How could this situation have arisen?

The CEO of HBOS, Andy Hornby, had arrived at HBOS triumphantly from ASDA, part of the Walmart Group. With no background in Financial Services but having graduated top of his course at Harvard and having had a successful career with the strategy consultancy, Boston Consulting Group prior to ASDA, he was seen as the person who would shake up the sleepy financial services industry. He surrounded himself with people who agreed with his position. Those who didn't agree with him got short shrift. Benny Higgins (currently CEO of Tesco Financial Services), had joined from RBS, where he had had a very successful career, to lead the HBOS retail banking business. He left after only a very short while when he fell out with Andy Hornby over strategy.

What this meant was that no one was there to challenge the strategy and the decisions that the CEO of HBOS was taking. Not dissimilar to the situation that was described in the recent report on what went wrong with the corporate governance at RBSG under the leadership of Fred Goodwin.

It is undoubtedly for this reason that the FSA is asking for a change at the Co-operative if they wish to push ahead with the acquisition of the Verde branches from Lloyds Banking Group. The FSA are insisting that the board of the Co-op must have much more experience of Financial Services and be able to challenge the executive leadership of Co-operative Financial Services. This could be such a significant challenge for the Co-op to make them question whether they will continue to pursue the deal. Finding people who the FSA will approve to run or sit on the board of a bank is increasingly difficult. It took Tesco over two and half years to get approval to set up their bank. The FSA has an increasingly large backlog of people to be approved to work in senior roles for banks and it now takes months to get approvals for an individual, even if that individual has already been approved for a similar role at the bank or a rival bank. Such a delay in being able to pushed forward with Verde could make the deal so unattractive to the Co-op that they walk away from it. However given what went on at HBOS and RBSG it is not difficult to understand why the FSA is pushing for this.

The culture of banks where the CEO's and other executives' words are final and unchallengeable is not something new and has always been dangerous.

A recent example of this is the fine raised on RBSG for complaints. The fine was not for the poor service that RBSG was giving its customers but for the fact that the complaints received were modifed by staff before being submitted to the Banking Ombudsman. The reason given being that the staff were afraid of the consequences for their careers of the complaints being upheld. What does this say about the culture at RBSG today, many years after Fred Goodwin left?

A further example that illustrates why the culture needs to change is that of the misselling of PPI (Payment Protection Insurance). It was known throughout the banking industry that both personal loans and mortgages were being sold at prices below cost and subsidised by the excessively high margins on PPI policies, which were very hard to claim on. Yet because it was so profitable no one spoke out and the number of PPI policies that were sold grew exponentially. Why did no one speak out? Surely the hierarchical, command and control culture of the banks has to be key to this along with the pursuit of short term profits at the cost of the customer.

The £8.75m fine imposed on Coutts, owned by RBSG, for not putting in adequate measures to ensure that the money-laundering wasn't taking place or that they were doing business with PEPS (Politically Exposed Persons). One of the reasons cited by the FSA for this behaviour was that staff were incentivised to add additional customers and balances with no measure about the quality of the balances or the customers, is yet more evidence for the need for a fundamental shift in the culture enforced by alignment of incentives with the values that the banks should be upholding.

Without a fundamental change to the culture of banks, where both independent, experienced voices are listended to and encouraged to challenge the exexcutive of banks and with CEOs and senior executives who encourage their staff to challenge their thinking without fear of reprisals then another HBOS, PPI misselling or the latest misselling of derivatives to SMEs is inevitable.