Showing posts with label Lloyds TSB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lloyds TSB. Show all posts

Monday, 18 August 2014

CBA proves the case for core banking replacement

CBA (Commonwealth Bank of Australia) has delivered record profits of $8.6bn AUD (£4.8bn, $8.0bn USD) for the year to June 2014. With a return on equity of 18.7% (versus typically 5-7% for US/UK banks and less for European banks) and a cost:income ratio of 36% for the retail bank (42.9% for the bank overall), this puts CBA amongst the most profitable banks in the world. It is also one of the banks with the fastest growing profits. This is despite fees paid by customers going down. The profit is being driven a combination of growing the revenues outperforming their competition and by increases in productivity. The CEO, Ian Narev, is clear that a major factor in the high performance of the bank is due to the major investments in technology, including the replacement of their core banking platforms.

For many banks the idea of replacing the core banking platforms is the equivalent of performing a full heart and lungs transplant while running a marathon. However, whilst most banks have not had the courage to embark on such a challenging endeavour, in 2006 CBA decided to. CBA made the task even harder by rather than choosing to replace their old legacy systems with proven technology they chose to be one of a very few pioneers with the new SAP Banking platform that, at that point, was largely unproven.

CBA have not been risk averse in adopting new technologies. They were one of the first banks to outsource their internet banking infrastructure to Amazon Web Services (AWS). See CBA and Amazon

The journey to their new banking platforms was not straight forward, bumps were found along the way and the costs rose above original estimates but there were releases along the journey which released business benefits and they have succeeded in delivering a completely new set of platforms to drive their business from. This has given them significant competitive advantage.

One consequence of simplifying their IT landscape has been a dramatic decrease in the number of high impact system impacts from 400 in FY2007 to a mere 44 in FY14. Considering the number of major outages that some of its competitor banks have had and the damage to the brand this is a significant achievement. It will undoubtedly have contributed to why CBA is #1 for customer satisfaction amongst Australian banks.

Among the benefits that the bank and the customers have experienced is a dramatic reduction in the time it takes to get innovations into production – two recent examples of this are Lock & Limit (allowing customers to block and/or limit the size of transactions) and Cardless Cash (customers being able to withdraw from ATMs using their mobile phones) which came to market in May 2014 ahead of competitor offerings.

CBA has also seen a significant increase in self-service with the percentage of deposits completed via an Intelligent Deposit Machine going from 10% to 37% over a twelve month period. With the launch of online opening of accounts (savings and current accounts) customers can now open accounts in less than 60 seconds.

None of the big UK banks has embarked upon a core banking platform replacement programme. Lloyds has consolidated and simplified its systems based on the legacy TSB platform. Santander has a single platform, Partenon, which is based on a banking package but it is legacy technology.  HSBC embarked on developing a single system for the Group, One HSBC, but that programme was stopped after a number of year. Nationwide Building Society is some way down the journey of implementing SAP Banking and is beginning to see the benefits with reduced times to launch products and propositions.
One of the key architects and sponsors of the technology transformation programme at CBA was Michael Harte. He is shortly to take up the role of COO with responsibility for IT at Barclays. There can be little doubt that his experience at CBA was the major attraction for his recruitment. The benefits that CBA is reaping following this six plus years journey are clear to see. The question is with all the challenges that Barclays faces, the size of the investment and the length of the return on that investment, the decreasing margins in banking and the amount of work needed to keep up with the regulatory burden whether Barclays will have the appetite and the staying power to embark upon what can be a highly rewarding but hazardous journey

Thursday, 24 April 2014

The challenges facing the next RBS CIO

With the news that Mike Errington, CIO of RBSG, is retiring the bank will be looking for a replacement. The new CIO will have an overflowing inbox, so for those considering taking on the role what are some of the challenges that he or she will have to face?

The immediate on-going work is to ensure the stability of the existing systems. Having had a number of serious, customer-impacting outages over the last few years (including a problem with Ulster Bank ATMs on the day this was written), the work of applying patches to and building resilience into both hardware and software needs to continue. RBS is not the only bank that in earlier times avoided doing maintenance as a way of saving costs and subsequently is feeling the impact of doing that in terms of reliability of systems.

The second tactical exercise is the simplification of the IT infrastructure. However this is far easier said than done as the IT systems have evolved over many decades, creating great complexity and the number of people who understand the older systems and how they interrelate is rapidly declining both as the result of retirement and cost cutting within the bank. Simplification is about retiring and rationalising systems and infrastructure. Given the complexity that exists this is alike disarming a booby-trapped Second World War bomb requiring both high levels of skills and nerves of steel.

Both of these steps are akin to re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic, given the ages of the systems. There is no doubt that there has been significant underinvestment in IT since way before the RBS/Natwest integration. Whoever is the new CIO they should use the opportunity of as part of their taking the role to negotiate a commitment to a wholesale replacement of the core retail banking system as the likes of CBA (Commonwealth Bank of Australia), Nationwide Building Society and Deutsche Bank have carried out. However this would involve spending measured in the low to mid billions of pounds and a programme taking 3-5 years to execute. This is where making such an essential change becomes particularly difficult specifically for RBS as RBS is not just any bank, it is a state-owned bank. Such is the political pressure to see the bank returned profitably to the private sector and within the first couple of years of the next government i.e. almost certainly by the end of 2018, that it is highly unlikely that the funding for such a major investment programme will get approval from the key shareholder. However that is what both the CIO and the CEO should be looking for if RBS is to once again become a truly competitive UK bank.

There are however other major transformation programmes that the new CIO will have to pick up, drive and deliver.

Having negotiated an extension of the deadline to the end of 2016 for the disposal of the 308 branches that RBS was forced by the EU to sell as a result of receiving state aid, creating a separate clone of the RBS systems for the new Williams & Glyn’s bank to run on is another top priority for the new CIO. This is not dissimilar to the exercise that Lloyds Banking Group had to perform to create the platform for TSB to run on. However the Lloyds Banking Group platforms were in a far better state than the RBS systems benefitting from coming on the back of creating a single set of systems for the Lloyds TSB/HBoS merger. Even having that advantage for Lloyds Banking Group creating the separate TSB platform was not simple or easy with the eventual cost being in the order of £2bn. Delivering the William and Glyn’s separation to the 2016 deadline will be a major achievement.

This is not the only separation programme that the CIO will have to oversee. The IPO of the Citizens business in the US in Q4 2014 and the complete disposal by the end of 2016 will also need to be executed. This will entail the disengaging of Citizens from the Group systems.

In addition there is the question of what to do with Ulster Bank. The preferred option is to dispose of it by selling it to one of the challenger Irish banks e.g. Permanent TSB, Danske Bank. If that is to go ahead then the new CIO will have to look at the separation of Ulster Bank from the Group systems and supporting the clone until it is integrated into the buyers' systems.

One of the core strategies of RBSG is to scale back the investment bank, reducing costs to be aligned with the smaller bank and to return the bank to be more focused on the UK and supporting UK businesses. This will inevitably require changes to the investment banking platforms as businesses are closed or sold off. To achieve the reduction in costs and the required flexibility as volume drops will almost inevitably mean looking at further outsourcing of platforms and operations to third parties.

On top of the RBSG specific initiatives the new CIO will also face the plethora of transformation programmes and projects that will need to be implemented as a result of regulatory changes. One of the core ones will be the implementation of ring-fencing once that is fully defined. This will mean a significant change in the governance of RBSG and there is a question as to whether the role of Group CIO can persist under the new rules, requiring in a significant restructuring of Group Operations.

All of this will need to be delivered whilst digital, mobile and the use of data analytics for both competitive advantage and risk management continue to move at pace in an increasingly competitive banking market.

The new RBS CIO will need to face up to this hugely challenging environment all within the constraints of  a bank operating very much in the public spotlight, with the need to rebuild trust and the financial constraints imposed by  having the government as the largest shareholder. Only the bravest should apply.

 

 

 

Monday, 27 January 2014

How to be a successful challenger bank


So assuming you have got the capital raised and have got through the regulatory hurdles necessary to be a challenger bank what the critical factors for success?

Pick your battleground. Given that the big five banks (in the UK) or the Four Pillars (in Australia) or the equivalent in other markets are so called because they have the scale and the established track record trying to take them head on at their own game is a sure fire guarantee of failure. To paraphase the Chinese general Sun Tsu in his ‘Art of War’ only attack the enemy head on if you have a three to one advantage.  A bank that wants to take on the banks across their entire retail customer base is setting itself up to fail. The established big players have the depth of capital and the customer base to play the long game and can besiege the challenger bank until they have used up all their capital and their investors patience.

For challenger banks the better strategy is to ‘fragment’ i.e. to pick off part of the established banks’s customer base, preferably one of the more profitable segments.

By not having a clear customer segment strategy but simply competing for business that can be won from the established banks can end up with the so-called challenger winning the unprofitable business that the big five would happily like to exit.  

Handelsbanken have never sought to be a replacement for the big five banks in the UK for all their customers. They have deliberately adopted a strategy that focuses on small businesses in largely market towns where customers like to use branches, have face to face contact and are prepared to pay for that service. The result has been very high customer satisfaction along with high profitability.

First Direct (albeit owned by HSBC) set out to be a bank for customers that weren’t interested in visiting branches, liked to be able to talk to a person, liked a high quality of service and were prepared to pay for it. First Direct is very rarely at the top of the price tables. Equally First Direct has not tried to grow its customer base aggressively with its market share relatively stable and relatively small. What they have ended up with is the highest Net Promoter Score amongst the banks.

Consider competing from a position of better insight. The established banks have the scale, the benefits of a high margin back book and the deep pockets so competing purely on price is not a long term strategy. Neither is competing simply on not being one of them. Some of the legacy problems the established banks have is their data has grown up from individual product systems, there is a culture of not sharing data between organisational silos, their systems have often grown from a series of acquisitions and are based on old technology. This gives the challenger bank a real opportunity. Designing the bank from the start to be based around the customer not the product, designing the data infrastructure around the ability to analyse, model and forecast not only the customer, but the risk, the external environment and the way the business performance will be managed will give the challenger bank a significant advantage. By having better customer insight offers can be better tailored to what the customer actually wants (resulting in a reduced Cost Per Acquisition), pricing can be based on individual or segment risk (not only for lending but also for deposit pricing) and retention of customers can be significantly higher.

A good current/checking account offering is not optional. Without it being a real challenger is impossible. Unless you have a transactional product, one where the customer interacts with you frequently, you are not going to be able to own the customer relationship and whilst you might win in the short term it will only be for that. When you ask any customer who they bank with their first response will be the bank where their salary is paid into and which they use daily to buy goods and services with.

If the basis of competition is around taking  mortgages and savings market shares off the established banks, then effectively regardless of the ownership structure, this is a building society offering. Building societies have been around for over a hundred years and their attempts to be challenger banks can be seen in the demise of the likes of Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock.

Nationwide Building Society has shown that by having a good current account offering that they are a real challenger to the established banks. (Nationwide has done more than that as well but the current account has been a key building block to their success).

What’s more the current account offering needs to be designed to attract the customer segment that has been selected as part of the fragment strategy.

Most customers see one current account being the same as another. A lot of customers will also have been made more cynical because of the ‘value-added’ or packaged current accounts that were sold in the run up to the financial crash. These were accounts where it was questionable whether the ‘added value’ was worth the monthly fee. There are very few ways of differentiating a current account but certainly for a challenger bank it needs to be designed for being used on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. The established banks, whilst they may have deeper pockets, have old and under-maintained systems which should give challenger banks an advantage (see the comments about IT below)

The danger of coming out with a simple, low function current account is that the challenger bank ends up with the low income, highly unprofitable customers that established banks are obliged by governments to offer to the unbanked. While this may make the challenger bank popular with government it will do nothing to help investors and if that is not the customer segment being aimed for will only lead to brand confusion.

Design the business from the outside in. One of the biggest challenges the existing banks have is their organisation structure which is built around silos, largely product-based and very hard to change. This brings inflexibility and high cost. Challenger banks have a real opportunity to do something different, even if they have come into existence by acquiring an existing player. The way that the bank’s processes are designed should be driven by the experience that its customers, partners (intermediaries, aggregators, suppliers) want and then decide how it can be delivered profitably. Experience doesn’t just apply to getting a customer to purchase a product but also what happens after that. On-boarding is even more important now for retention, profitability and customer advocacy, particularly where business comes from brokers or comparison websites.

What typically happens is that organisations where there is any conscious design are built from the perspective of the bank and how it is easiest to manage, not from the customer’s or strategic supplier’s perspective. The challenger who gets this right will only be able to attract customers at a lower cost (reduced CPA), will reduce customer attrition and achieve higher customer referral rates.

Invest in talent and experience. Everybody thinks they are an expert in retail banking because everyone has a bank account. This is the equivalent of saying that everybody is a doctor because they have a body. If retail banking was really that easy and that profitable there would be no need for challenger banks. It is not only since the financial crash in 2008 that people have looked down on bankers and treated them as of less value than estate agents or tabloid journalists. Prior to the crash many banks employed retailers because they thought bankers were just staff who didn’t know how to sell properly. A probable consequence of the introduction of this retail talent was the PPI (Payment Protection Insurance) and the Structured Investments scandals, where sales techniques borrowed from the retail industry were applied to the banking industry. There is no doubt that the banking industry can benefit from the insights and experience of industries that deliver better customer service and use technology more smartly but that needs to be counterbalanced with deep experience of retail banking. Current account-based retail banking is far from the same as simply attracting deposits and selling mortgages. If retail banking was so easy why have the building societies (Nationwide excepted – see comment above) been so unsuccessful in making a significant dent in the established banks market share? To be a successful challenger bank investment in real expertise of current account banking is not optional.

Just because technology can do something doesn’t mean customers want it. There are plenty of digital gurus out there who are coming up with very imaginative ways of doing banking whether it is different ways of making payments (at least once a day someone somewhere in the world announces a new way of making payments), identifying the customer, wearing technology, and interacting in branches, but just because you can do it doesn’t mean you should. Unless it makes it more convenient for the customer (and many of the novel ways of making payments are cool but take longer than conventional ways of paying) then don’t do it. Being sexy is not a requirement to be a challenger bank.

Start from the goal of zero IT ownership - exploit the cloud, SaaS and outsourcing. The established banks have very expensive and old IT systems which they need to maintain. This comes from the legacy where banks were amongst the first organisations to use IT and therefore had no option but to build up their own expertise. With the maturity of the both the IT and the outsourcing industries there is no reason for banks to own or manage their own IT. Given the problems established banks have had with their legacy systems over the last few years their competency as an IT provider has been seriously tested. Not only does putting IT out to third parties save overall money but it also allows the challenger banks to focus on what is important and that is the provision of banking to their customers.

For many banks using the cloud to provide banking services has been unthinkable. However Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), the former public sector bank, has its internet banking hosted by Amazon. (See http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2012/12/commonwealth-bank-of-australia-run-by.html) If a traditionally conservative bank has done that why wouldn’t challenger banks adopt that approach?

Metro Bank, one of the challenger banks in the UK, has bought the use of its core banking service on a per transaction basis (SaaS – Software as a Service). Its IT is outsourced. When the time it took to Metro Bank to launch its current account is compared with Tesco Bank (which is building its own platform based on a core banking package) then there is a clear argument for considering SaaS.

 Taking modern technology and commercial approaches should give challengers a great advantage; however it isn’t always turning out that way.  A number of challenger banks are being created by the acquisition of assets from existing players. They would argue that by having existing proven platforms that they can be up and running faster than starting from scratch. This is true in the short term but rather than being able to offer a truly differentiated service what they offer is a smaller but more expensive (due to the smaller scale and, in some cases, having to pay one of the big 5 banks to support the IT) version of the established banks. This is the situation that both TSB (the former Verde Lloyds Banking Group 630 branches) and William & Glyns (the 316 RBS branches) find themselves in.  (See http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2013/07/can-tsb-be-challenger-bank.html) In the longer term this is not a viable solution for a challenger bank.

Challenger banks who have acquired legacy IT, need a transformational CIO working alongside the bank’s executives, to put in place a plan to get off the legacy and onto modern platforms enabled for mobile and digital as quickly as possible. They also need to be experts in strategic supplier management. The challenger banks need to educate their investors that this is not optional.

Have an exclusive relationship with major investors and get them committed for the long haul. There are plenty of hedge, private equity and sovereign funds who are interested in investing in challenge banks, however a number of them have placed investments in more than one challenger bank in the same sector in the same country. What does that say about their commitment?

To build a sustainable challenger bank will take time particularly given the limited availability of off the shelf banking technology and the time it takes to implement a new business model. Equally getting a return on these investments is not going to be quick, so investors who aren’t in for the long haul should be politely shown the door.

This isn’t meant to be an exhaustive list of what a challenger bank should be looking at but highlights some of the areas where the difference can be between success and failure.

Saturday, 11 January 2014

Removing incentives won't stop bank mis-selling


The news that Lloyds Banking Group has been fined £28m ($46m) by Britain’s FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) for having a bonus scheme that put pressure on sales staff to mis-sell products once again brings the spotlight to bear on the culture of banks and specifically, in this case, retail banks.  In Lloyds’ case it was not only the benefits of meeting or achieving targets that created inappropriate behaviour but the sanctions for missing targets including demotion and base salary reduction that put staff under pressure. For at least one sales person they felt under such pressure not to fail that they inappropriately sold products that they could not afford to themselves and their family as well as their colleagues.

The typical media and political response to incidents such as this is to suggest that incentives are bad, that remuneration shouldn’t be related to achieving targets as incentives lead to the wrong sets of behaviours.

However simply removing the explicit link between sales performance and pay will not remove the pressure to achieve sales targets.

The pressure comes right from the top. While the new CEOs of banks may publicly talk about changing the culture of banks, putting the customer at the heart of the bank, winning through providing a differentiated service and they may be completely sincere in those sentiments, by the time that that message is passed down through the organisation to the sales people at the frontline it will be measured in terms of targets, which will need to be achieved. Anglo Saxon businesses are run with a performance management culture where achieving or exceeding targets and  giving greater rewards to those who meet those targets than those who don’t  is fundamental to how those businesses operate. While it may never have been the intention of Antonio Horta-Osario, CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, that the staff be put under such pressure that they coerced customers into buying products that they did not need, by the CEO setting his or her direct reports stretch targets that was the almost inevitable consequence.

The reason for this is simple: banks are commercial businesses that have investors who are looking for returns and always have the option to invest their money elsewhere if the return is better. As such CEOs of banks are competing for investment and are accountable to their shareholders. This applies as much to new entrants and challenger banks as it does to the established banks. All of the new entrant banks without exception have investors backing them whether it is parent companies such as retailers, hedge funds, Private Equity funds or individual wealthy investors. Even the building societies and mutual have to look to the external market for capital and those who lend capital have options as to where they lend to and are doing to achieve competitive return.

But is a culture that is about beating the competition, about achieving the best that you can for your organisation really such a bad thing? Certainly the impression that many politicians gives is that yes it is. The sentiments being expressed have strong parallels with the period where some schools banned competitive sports because politicians believed they were harmful to children.  It wasn’t good for children because it meant that some of them would have to experience losing.

The politicians who rally against the banks and banker compensation schemes can’t have it both ways. On the one hand they say don’t want those in banks to be incentivised to sell customers products but on the other hand they want competition. Competition by its very nature requires a level of aggression, it requires you to play to win and for your opponents to lose.

To demonstrate that they are not solely focussed on financial outcomes most banks today use a balanced set of financial and non-financial measures to monitor the performance of the bank and their employees.   Typical non-financial measures include Net Promoter Score (NPS), customer satisfaction, numbers of complaints and staff engagement.  The argument being that by having a balanced set of measures sales staff are incentivised to treat customers fairly and to only sell customers what they need.

Some banks such as Barclays and HSBC have removed all financial incentives for their staff to sell customers products. Instead their staff are paid a basic salary with the ability to share in a bonus depending on the performance of the bank. However, even when that is the case, every customer facing bank employee who has responsibility for helping a customer to apply for a mortgage or open a savings account knows that, at the end of the day, when it comes to the annual performance review whether they have achieved or missed their financial targets will always be more important than whether they have achieved their non-financial ones. They know that their opportunity to receive a pay rise, to get a bonus or to progress their careers is dependent upon their ability to deliver profits for their bank. The financial incentive may not be explicit but it is still there.

There exceptions to this.  A bank that has taken a very different approach is Handelsbanken. At this bank if the profitability exceeds the average rate of its peers, then surplus profits are put into a fund and distributed to all the staff. However they can only receive these accumulated benefits when they turn 60, thus encouraging long-term thinking and loyalty. The staff, including the executives, have flat salaries with no bonuses. There are no sales or market share targets. Handelsbanken has very high customer satisfaction and is highly profitable. The bank has had no problems with mis-selling or wrongdoing.

However this model will not suit everybody. This is very much a Scandinavian model and the pace of growth whilst highly profitable will not be attractive to all investors. Detractors of this approach will argue that no highly talented executive would be attracted by this reward model when there are banks across the globe prepared to reward more in the short term. The sustained excellent results that Handelsbanken have delivered speak for themselves.  Handelsbanken  would probably argue that it has no desire to attract the sort of executives who are interested in only the short term and will move from bank to bank simply for better rewards.

Given that the reality is the Handelsbanken model cannot and should not be imposed upon all banks, what is the answer and how can this type of mis-selling be avoided in the future?

The reality is that it will never be totally eliminated. Indeed if there were never any complaints or if there were never any practices that could be open to question it would suggest that the hunger to be the best, the passion to grow the business was missing. Every sportsman who wants to be the best knows that you have to go the edge to succeed.   There will always be employees who are too aggressive or dishonest. It is that they are identified and the way that they are handled that sends out the signal to their fellow employees as to what is acceptable behaviour. That has to be called out loud and clear and demonstrated by actions from the top of the organisation.

Secondly, while many banks operate a balanced scorecard of financial and non-financial metrics to measure the performance of the bank, the financial rewards need to be truly aligned to that Scorecard and not just to the bottom line. Not only must reward be aligned to the scorecard it needs to be seen to be aligned. This means that for instance if customer satisfaction or employee engagement scores are part of that scorecard and those measures are not met or regulators impose fines despite financial targets being met, that the executives’ rewards are significantly financially reduced. This is something that has not been reflected across the banking industry despite the enormous financial fines handed out to the likes of JP Morgan and Barclays.

Thirdly there needs to be a recognition by investors that the days of retail banks being a licence to print cash are over, that most banks need significant investment both in terms of capital to fund the business but also to provide the infrastructure that a bank needs to have to compete in the 21st century and finally that an investment in a bank is for the long term – measured in double digit years.

Changing the culture of retail banks is not as easy as simply removing incentives, neither it is something that can be done overnight. To have a vibrant and competitive banking industry there needs to be some friction and a world without it will be a lot worse for the consumer.

Sunday, 11 August 2013

Who should buy the RBS branches?

On the face of it the Lloyds Banking Group's and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group's forced disposal of their branches look quite alike. Even the numbers of branches being disposed of, in a dyselexic way, are the same 631 and 316 respectively. Both were imposed by the European Union as a result of state intervention. to save the banks brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. Both Groups have struggled to find buyers for their branches. Both banks have had potential buyers walk away from their deal late in the day - the Co-op in the case of Lloyds Banking Group and Santander in the case of Royal Bank of Scotland Group. Both are now pursuing floatation of the severed entities due to a lack of interest from potential buyers.

However fundamentally the offerings for potential buyers are different and therefore the people and organisations that should seriously consider and be considered for the acquisitions are quite different.

The reason that Lloyds Banking Group have been instructed to sell 631 branches and their associated customers is because, following their arms being severely twisted by the Government to save HBoS by acquiring it, LBG was left with a very dominant market position in unsecured lending, mortgage and current accounts for consumers whilst being underpinned by government support.

For RBSG selling their 361 branches was both due to the level of government support that required to save them from their self-created problem and their overwhelming dominance of the SME market segment. Thus the customers that RBSG is selling are small and medium sized business customers.

Some might say that retail and SME banking are not that different. Indeed that debate has been running for decades with banks periodically changing where SME banking sits in their organisation between within the retail and within the corporate bank. Business Banking has not sat comfortably in either organisation being neither fish or fowl.

As is being evidenced by Santander in its results, Business Banking is nowhere near as straightforward as retail banking and requires significantly more capital for every loan. Santander who is one of the few banks that has been able to build a global retail banking platform (that has enabled to make numerous successful acquistions across the globe) has found it very challenging to bend their Partenon banking platform to support UK Business Banking customers needs. Indeed it was IT issues that were cited by Santander as the reason that the acquisition of the RBSG branches was halted.

The difference from retail banking extend way beyond just capital and technology and into the most important part of banking - the people who work in it and the skills and competencies they require. It is not impossible to move from retail banking to SME banking, but  it requires a different mindset and different skills.

Another difference between the LBG and the RBSG disposals is the condition of the IT systems. Lloyds Banking Group has, as a result of the acquisition of HBoS and the need to fundamentally reduce costs, been through an exercise of migration and simplification of banking systems. The starting point, the TSB systems, were newer and better designed than either Lloyds Bank, RBS or Natwest systems, so provided LBG with a far better starting position than RBSG finds itself in. The problems that RBSG has had with its banking platforms over the last few years are well documented and have been very obvious to their customers.

Whoever acquires or enters into a joint venture with RBSG needs to recognise that they will need to partner with RBSG IT for at least the next five years as it is very unlikely that moving onto a new platform and separating from the old one could be achieved any faster than that. This means that the acquirer's business will be dependent upon RBSG being able to provide IT services to keep their business going. This was clearly something that Santander found to be unpalatable.

This raises the question of who should acquire RBSG's branches? Given that the deals risks are already high (amount of capital, market risk, IT risk), then when RBSG considers who to partner with then a consideration has to be which of the potential buyers reduces the deal risk the most whilst still offering an attractive commerical proposition. One of the key ways to reduce the risk is to sell to a buyer who fundamentally understands and has a proven track record in SME banking.

Anacap who's bid is led by Alan Hughes the former First Direct (a retail bank) boss also owns Aldermore the UK banks that focuses solely on SME banking. Anacap has the experience of setting up a new SME bank, putting in new platforms and writing profitable business. This has to count for a lot.

The Standard Life bid (teamed with Corsair Capital and Centrebridge) is being led by John Maltby the former head of SME Banking (and Kensington Mortgages the buy-to-let specialist) at Lloyds Banking Group. This consortium also has the backing of the Church Commissioners, though whether this suggests any divine preference is doubtful.

Finally there is the consortium led by Andy Higginson the former Tesco Finance Director who has experience of working with RBSG when he was involved in the launch of Tesco Personal Finance.

Competition in the SME banking market has changed since 2008 when the EU decision to force RBSG to dispose of market share with the increasing presence of Santander, Aldermore and Handelsbanken, it is a very different market with different regulatory requirements.

So for whoever decides to buy the RBSG branches the latin expression could not be more appropriate - caveat emptor!

Tuesday, 2 July 2013

Can TSB really be a challenger bank?

With the letters going out to effected existing Lloyds' customers and the announcement that from September 632 Lloyds Banking Group branches will be re-branded 'TSB' does this herald a new competitor in the UK banking market or it just a mini-me Lloyds Bank brand? This is a question that will not only be asked by those customers being migrated to the 'new' bank but also by existing Lloyds' customers, politicians, banking regulators and the European Union. Ultimately it was the European Union that has forced the launch of TSB as a consequence of the state intervention required after Lloyds TSB was compelled to buy HBoS.

From September TSB will have the same products, the same propositions, the same terms & conditions, the same computer systems (or at least a copy of them), the same staff  and the same executive team as they do now and have had for some time. The branches will be re-branded but the staff that work in them will be the staff that worked in the same Lloyds TSB branch, working to the same incentives.

In many respects for customers who have chosen to join Lloyds TSB and are being forced to switch to TSB this could be seen as positive as their new bank will be re-assuringly the same. However over time, if TSB is to become a challenger to the established banks then this will need to change.

One of the most important requirements for TSB to become a challenger is to have different ownership. Lloyds Banking Group has applied to the EU for a two year extension to the deadline to sell off the 632 branches. As this is written there has been no indication whether this has been granted. Whether this comes from an IPO (most likely) or from a single or syndicate of investors wishing to buy TSB time will tell. However Verde, as the project  to separate and sell the branches and supporting infrastructure was called, has been running for some years already and no one has come forward with a compelling and executable proposition to buy the business. (The Co-op's proposition proved to unviable and the NBNK proposal was rejected by Lloyds Banking Group as being insufficiently commercial, though whether that was a political decision is a moot point)

Whilst TSB is still fully owned by Lloyds Banking Group it will be no more of a true challenger to the Big 5 banks (Barclays, RBSG, Lloyds, HSBC and Santander) than its sister brand, Halifax.

Credit where credit is due Lloyds Banking Group knows how to run separate brands off the same systems and processes and has done it very successfully since the integration of Lloyds TSB and HBoS was successfully completed. Halifax is seen as an edgier, cost conscious brand than the more conservative Lloyds brand. The Halifax executive team have largely been kept in tact and have been able to retain much of the culture of the bank prior to takeover.The staff still identify with the brand they work for. Indeed to many customers Lloyds and Halifax are quite separate banks and there are customers who move to Halifax to get away from Lloyds and vice-versa. However ultimately both banks report into the same Lloyds Banking Executive, Alison Brittain and she reports to Lloyds Banking Group CEO, Antonio Horta-Osario. Both banks answer to the same shareholders principally the government.

It is a fallacy that there is no competition in UK banking, there are an increasing number of players out in the market offering retail banking services - Nationwide, Yorkshire Building Society, Yorkshire Bank, Clydesdale Bank, M&S Bank, Co-operative Bank, Tesco Bank, Sainsbury's Bank, Metro Bank, Virgin Money to name just a few. However it is true that the Big 5 still continue to have the dominant market share. With the introduction of easier switching in the Autumn the excuse that it is too difficult to change banks will be taken away. The fundamental reason that customers don't switch banks as much as politicians and regulators would like is that banking is to a large extent seen by customers as a commodity and really not that interesting. Banks are also seen as being as bad as each other so why customers can't be bothered changing when it really won't make a lot of difference.

For TSB to be a real challenger then it needs to be able to answer the question of what can it offer that will make those not compelled to become its customers to switch their banking business to TSB.
This has the potential to be a bigger hurdle for TSB than for some of the other players. The executive team of TSB are highly capable people, but they have worked for Lloyds Banking Group for a considerable period and a question is whether have been immersed in that culture and that way of doing business are they able to come up with a fresh way of delivering banking that will be attractive to their customers? If they are able to come up with a fresh proposition will they be able to actually deliver it given that they will be dependent upon Lloyds Banking Group and its legacy systems to deliver their proposition? Given their size in comparison to Lloyds Banking Group and the other Big 4 will they be able to invest enough, particularly in all things digital and mobile to be able to compete with the far larger budgets that the others have?

Is the reality that despite all the best intents and capabilities of the leadership of TSB that with the restrictions laid on them such as ownership, access to capital, size and dependency on Lloyds Banking Group that the best that can be expected from TSB is a slightly less good mini-me?

Only time will tell, but for the good of consumers and for the health of the retail banking industry in the UK it is has to be hoped that TSB will emerge as a strong challenger bank.

For official answers on how TSB will operate go to
<a href="http://www.tsb.co.uk/">www.tsb.co.uk/</a>

Friday, 7 June 2013

Will challenger banks make a real impact on UK lending?

Antony Jenkins, the CEO of Barclays, told investors that the challenger banks will fail to make a real impact on the lending market in the UK in the coming years.

His argument was that those who look to acquire the branches available by the forced sale of Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland branches when customers are using branches less and less in favour of online banking are buying a wasting asset.

Simplistically this is right, however even in markets where customers are carrying out a greater proportion of their banking business online such as The Netherlands, where 50% of branches have been closed, when a customer has a complex financial problem that needs fixing those customers are still showing a strong preference to address these face to face in a branch.

Even in a digital world the branch is still an important part of the marketing and branding for all the world's major banks. Branches are perceived as a reassuring sign of the stability of the bank, that by having a physical presence the bank is not going to disappear overnight.

What Anthony Jenkins did not explore is how the role of the branch is and needs to evolve (something which Barclays as an organisation is very aware of). The challengers recognise that branches are generally under-utilised assets and are being far more creative about their role in the community whether it be for business meetings, book clubs, music soirees or simply somewhere to go for a coffee. Banks such as Oregon's Umpqua (www.umpquabank.com) and Virgin Money with their lounges (http://uk.virginmoney.com/virgin/about-lounges/) are taking forward the thinking on the future of the branch. Antony Jenkins is right that the big five banks are increasingly closing branches but the challengers with their far smaller branch footprint are opening new branches rather than closing them. Handlesbanken (www.handelsbanken.co.uk) have been quietly opening branches and have been having a not insignificant impact on the market particularly on business lending.

When Jenkins referred to the challengers he appeared to limit that to those who might acquire the Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland branches, but of course this is not where the only challenge to the lending market is going to come from. Tesco, M&S and Sainsbury's banks already have very large branch networks they just happen to be retail outlets. Betting against these three making a success of their banking business is the height of folly.

Where Jenkins is completely correct is that for a challenger to simply open branches, and specifically traditional branches, would not be a wise move given the evolution of the customer and the banking industry. However the main challengers are not doing that. They are looking at an omni-channel strategy where online, mobile, call centre and branches come together to provide a new and better customer experience. There is a recognition that even in the branch customers may want to access their mobile or online banking services, that digital opens up the range of services that a branch can perform.

Taken at face value Antony Jenkins' comments that challenger will have little real impact on the UK lending industry smacks of complacency which the challenger banks should be delighted to hear. However given Jenkins' experience and knowledge of retail banking the challengers should not underestimate the fight they have on their hands. This can only be good for customers.

Monday, 27 May 2013

Why the Co-op is right to stop new commercial lending




Commercial lending has been a significant contributor to the downfall of a number of financial services organisations. This was the primary reason that HBoS failed and subsequently took Lloyds Banking Group down with it. It was also the principle cause of the failure of Bradford & Bingley who made a major play into the buy-to-let market. Alliance & Leicester kept out of that market until the temptation of high margins and growth became too great to resist and paid the ultimate price by, like Bradford & Bingley, having to be 'rescued' by Santander. Britannia Building Society, which the Co-op acquired, aggressively entered the commercial lending market prior to its acquistion. Indeed it is the size and the problems within the Britannia Building Society commercial lending book that has fundamentally caused the huge capital gap and the down grading of the Co-op's credit rating.

A question has to be why so many safe building societies/mutuals have been tempted into commercial lending and got it so wrong?

There is no doubt that in the good times that commercial lending is highly attractive with guaranteed rents and better margins than for residential lending. The size of deals are far larger than for residential lending and for those who are motivated by numbers signing a deal measured in millions rather than hundreds of thousands is very attractive.

There is also no doubt that market for commercial lending is very much more volatile than for residential lending. Up until 2008 it was always the perceived belief that the only direction for residential housing prices to go was up - the expression 'as safe as houses' was for good reason.

The residential housing market is also more homogenous than commercial lending. Commercial lending has a wide variety of segments such as hotels, offices, retail and industrial. These segments operate in different ways, have different cycles and require specialist knowledge.

Commercial lending requires high amounts of capital, has a far broader range of risks than residential lending and requires having a large diversified portfolio to be successful in the long term.

For residential lending there is a lot of data about the market available, the amount of capital for each individual deal is a lot less, there is a huge amount of historical data, so making fact based decisions is relatively straigh forward.

The same cannot be said for commercial lending. What is critical for success in commercial lending is both internal and external data on what is going on in the market. This includes knowing and understanding what the competitors are doing. If a bank is winning all the commercial lending deals and others are withdrawing from the market then the executive need to be asking why. A question is whether the banks that failed had the data and the analytics in place and, if so, why they didn't respond to it?

For many years banks have wrestled with the decision of whether SME banking sits with the retail bank or the commercial and corporate bank. At least one lesson that should be taken from the financial crisis is that the skills, knowledge and understanding that is required to lend to consumers and the mass market is quite different from those to lend to businesses. To move from retail to commercial lending is not a continuum but to move into a totally different business. It appears that the new CEO of the Co-op gets this and has wisely decided that commercial lending is a step too far. The question outstanding is still whether the Co-op should be in banking at all?

Wednesday, 15 May 2013

Should Co-op exit banking?

As incoming CEO, Euan Sutherland, reviews his options for raising potentially in excess of £1bn extra capital, given the issues he faces, rather than considering selling off his funeral business (a recession proof, profitable business), a logical option would be to look at selling off Co-op Bank.

The problems that Co-op Bank has both with the quality of the debt and the IT sit squarely with the misguided acquistion of Britannia Building Society. It is Britannia's foray into commercial property that has resulted in the downgrading of the Co-op's debt. It is the poorly executed integration of Britannia into the Co-op bank that has cost more, taken longer and has not left the Co-op with a viable banking platform. Both of those facts not only de-railed the Verde deal but should have been enough of a warning to both the Treasury and the FSA (as the regulatory body at that time) not to proceed with the Co-op as the preferred buyer of Verde.

A question that Euan Sutherland needs to answer as part of his strategic review is does it make strategic sense for the Co-op to own a bank? If it does, what will it cost to take what he currently has and turn it into a significant competitor in the market?

Tesco has invested heavily and continues to in Tesco Bank. It is taking more time and costing a lot more than it  was orignally envisaged to re-launch it as a full service retail bank. However its starting position was and is very different from that of the Co-op. For a start Tesco is world class at customer analytics and applying that to its business. With the launch of the Tesco Clubcard and the acquisition of the customer analytics business Dunhumby, Tesco has a wealth of information and insight about its customers which it already leverages and with the launch of current accounts and mortgages will be able to leverage further for its bank. Secondly Philip Clarke, the CEO of Tesco, recognises that digital is the second curve (the first curve being the stores) that Tesco must invest in to win in the market. Having a large estate of stores is not enough anymore to win in Financial Services or Retail. Tesco is investing millions in digital for both marketing and selling. With Tesco Mobile as part of its offering it is also very well positioned to lead in mobile payments and banking.

Although Sainsbury's was the first amongst the UK supermarkets to launch a bank, it allowed Tesco to overtake it. With the announcement by Sainsbury's that they have bought out Lloyds Banking Group's share of Sainsbury's Bank and will be investing £260m over the next 42 months to put in place a new banking platform, the seriousness of Sainsbury's intent to become a significant competitor for financial services is clear. Like Tesco, Sainsbury's will leverage the synergies from their stores and the customer insight they get from the Nectar card. Like the Tesco Clubcard Nectar will be a critical part of it's differentiated offering. Sainsbury's too is investing in digital (though it lags Tesco) and recognise the need to deliver omni-channel propositions i.e. allowing customers to interact with the bank over multiple channels simultaneously. Sainsbury's will in many ways be playing catch up on Tesco, however in comparison to Co-op are still significantly ahead.

Co-op still needs to complete the integration of Britannia Building Society, would need to invest significantly in digital for both the retail and banking offerings to even compete. To  be in a position to leverage the synergies between the bank and the rest of the Co-op Group will require significant investment beyond that required to meet regulatory requirements.

When Euan Sutherland looks at all of this, the capital he will need to inject onto the bank's balance sheet, the  size of the investments he will need to make to even get close to Tesco and Sainsbury's in terms of financial services, the time it will take and the likely returns he will need to consider whether this really is the best place for both his customers and members to place his bet.

However who will be interested in buying and how much they will be willing to pay for Co-op Bank with it's junk status debt given that there are at least two other banks available on the market - the 316 RBSG branches and the 632 Lloyds Banking Group Verde branches? There is no doubt that Euan Sutherland has some tough decisions to make in his first few months.

Wednesday, 24 April 2013

Will Verde be Co-op's ABN Amro?


In April 2007 John Varley, then CEO of Barclays, in an attempt to vault Barclays into the Premier League of investment banking made a bid for ABN Amro. Not to be outdone Sir Fred Goodwin put together a consortium consisting of RBS, Santander and Fortis to put in a counter bid.

Through the spring and summer of 2007 a battle took place to win ABN Amro. It could be said that it stopped being entirely about the business sense of acquiring the bank and more about winning the deal, beating the other CEO. This was a deal that appeared to be personal. The price continued to rise.

Finally in early October John Varley and Barclays conceded defeat and withdrew their offer. Barclays was rewarded with being paid 200m Euros as a break fee by ABN Amro. Even at the time of Barclays' withdrawal analysts were saying that RBS was paying too much. One said that RBS was going to be struck by 'the winner's curse'.

The rest, as they say is history. The capital required, the slow down and eventual crash of the global markets and the complexity of the integration all contributed to the situation RBS finds itself in now.

Looking at the Co-op's pursuit of the  632 Verde branches that Lloyds Banking Group has to sell, there appear to be some parallels with the ABN Amro pursuit. Could it be that the Co-op will also be struck down with 'the winner's curse'?

The pursuit of Verde has not been as long as for ABN Amro but it appears to have been as personal. In July 2012 Peter Marks, the CEO of Co-op, boasted that he has taken the shirt off the back of the  Lloyds Banking Group CEO, Antonio Horta-Osario, as they agreed to a £750m price tag. Given that the expectation had been that Verde would sell for between £1.5-2bn, he may have had a point, though he may have been better keeping his opinion to himself.

However Co-op is also paying a big price in other ways to raise the capital it needs to acquire Verde. With the announcement of the sale of its Life & Pensions and Savings business to Royal London and its instruction of Deutsche Bank to find a buyer for its General Insurance business, the Co-op's existing financial services business is being taken apart in order to raise the capital for Verde. Aviva is rumoured to be interested in acquiring the General Insurance business.These deals are not dependent on the Verde deal going through, so should the deal fail the Co-op will be in a much poorer state.

Similarly RBS had to raise a lot of money in order to pay the price it had agreed for ABN Amro. In RBS's case it went to the market and executed a huge rights issue for which in a class action it is now being sued). This left RBS with a highly weakened balance sheet, which made it unable to absorb the massive change in the market. How would RBSG have fared if they hadn't pursued and won ABN-Amro? They certainly would still have had problems with their exposure to Ireland through Ulster Bank and the investment banking business would still have been hit, but with a stronger balance sheet and without the exposure to the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) that ABn Amro brought the size of the bailout required from the UK Government would have been significantly lower. Fred Groodwin would almost certainly be Sir Fred Goodwin and his pension would be intact.

Should the acquisition still go ahead, which is looking less likely, this will not be a simple integration by any stretch of the imagination. The integration of Britannia Building Society has proved to be a major challenge for the Co-op, Verde will far more complex. Again looking back at RBS, Sir Fred Goodwin went into the ABN Amro integration full of confidence that the bank knew how to do integrations, but Natwest was fundamentally a larger version of RBS so it was a homogenous integration, ABN Amro was an integration of something quite different from RBS and the costs of integration ballooned.

One of the worst scenarios for the Co-op is that they sell off the assets they need in order to complete the Verde transaction and then fail to close the purchase. This would leave the Co-op in a weakened position in terms of Financial Services and overall in a poorer strategic position.

Whilst Peter Marks may have got what appears to be a rock bottom price for Verde the Co-op will be tied to Lloyds Banking Group for many years to come since they have agreed to pay for and use the Lloyds Banking Group systems for the Verde branches. It will take hundreds of millions of pounds and  years to move off these systems and onto a modern architected banking system so Co-op and Lloyds Banking Group will be partners for many years to come.  The Co-op may need to be reminded of the expression that revenge is a meal best eaten cold.

In the meantime Santander has withdrawn from the acquisition of the 316 branches that RBS is being forced to sell. Santander is a bank that appears to always make smart deals - Abbey National, Bradford & Bingley, Alliance & Leicester and Antonveneta to name a few. Antonveneta was owned by ABN Amro and was one part of Santander's element of the consortium bid led by RBS. In true Santander style it sold Antonveneta on to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena before Santander had even taken possession making a $3.5bn profit in the process. For Peter Marks it would be sensible to contemplate why Santander withdrew from the RBS branch purchase and reflect on how that might apply to the Verde deal.

As the crunch point approaches when Co-op must decide one way or another to complete or walk away from the deal and Peter Marks looks forward to his retirement, it would be good to have one last reflection on the deal and to decide whether he would rather be John Varley, who walked away from a bad deal with his reputation intact, or Fred Goodwin who was struck down by the winner's curse.

Update April 24th 2013.

So Peter Marks made the almost certainly right decision to walk away from the Verde deal. For the Co-op to have been burdened with the debt and enormous risks of the Verde deal would not have been a good leaving present.

However it does bring into question the future of financial services within the Co-op. Having sold the life and savings business to Royal London and with the general insurance business on the blocks a question has to be whether the Co-op should pull out of financial services altogether. The integration of Britannia into Co-op Financial Services has been a major challenge and it has not resulted in a real challenger to the Big 5 banks. The Co-op is at a crossroads and needs to decide whether financial services is really a business it can be successful in.

Monday, 23 July 2012

Is Co-op really a contender with Lloyds' Verde?


Lloyds and the Co-op?


What Co-op is acquiring is the 632 branches that Lloyds has had to sell, with all the Lloyds TSB Bank branches in Scotland, the Cheltenham & Gloucester branches across the UK and the rest made up of other Lloyds TSB branches. They will also get the CEO of Verde, Paul Pester, his team and the management and the staff for those branches. Lloyds Banking Group will provide and manage the systems for the foreseeable future.

What does this mean? Starting with the customers there is no guarantee that the customers for those branches will move to Co-op. Whilst Lloyds Banking Group can't market to those customers to transfer their business back to Lloyds, customers are not obligated to stay and could easily move their accounts to another bank, including Lloyds. Evidence of this was seen when Santander bought the RBS branches that had to be sold. Customers did not like the idea of being sold and many have moved their accounts before the transaction went through. As a consequence the value of the deal to Santander has gone down significantly.

Looking at the leadership and staff of the new bank - it is the old leadership and staff. Many of these people will have been at either Lloyds or TSB for many, many years, so there is no guarantee that they won't continue to deliver banking the way that they always have done. Indeed the systems will enforce the processes and incentives of the existing Lloyds Banking Group. Verde, or TSB as it will be branded, could be just a mini-me Lloyds Bank, without the scale to compete.

Having Verde run on the Lloyds' existing systems for the foreseeable future has two distinct disadvantages for the Co-op.

Firstly, the acquisition benefits of rationalising systems and processes that usually underpin any M&A deal are not going to be realised. Instead the Co-op will end up running their Co-op and Britannia branches using the Co-op systems and processes (assuming the completion of the migration of the Britannia systems onto the Co-op platform) and the TSB branches using the Verde systems and processes. Many of the synergies that the bank would have hoped to realise from their 1000 branches will not be achieved until they can move onto a single platform. Due to the complexity and the cost of the Verde systems the migration has been kicked into the long grass. The Co-op will have all the overheads of having to support three brands in the market, Co-operative, Britannia and now TSB. Not only is there expense in running multiple brands, but significant scope for confusion amongst customers. Rather than having a new 1000 branch contender there will be three brands fighting to compete for customers all with less scale than the Big 5.

Secondly Antonio Horta-Osorio, the CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, recognises that the systems underpinning Lloyds are simply not good enough to compete in today's retail banking market. This is why he is spending hundreds of millions of pounds on the 'Simplification' programme to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the banking systems to enable them to compete in the mutlichannel, always available, digital world. However those improvements will not be applied to the Verde systems. To use an Olympics analogy it is like your older brother giving you his old Nikes while he is upgrading to the far superior ones. Who would you expect to win in those circumstances?

With the size and scale of Lloyds Banking Group there is far more scope for investment in making the retail bank fit and efficient than there is for the Co-op. Not only that, when the Co-op wants to make upgrades to their TSB systems they will be dependent on Lloyds Banking Group to make those changes for them. Whilst Lloyds can be recognised for its history and experience of  excellence in retail banking it is not well known for its provision of IT services and certainly not as a commercial provider of IT services. The Co-op may find itself held back by the speed and agility of not only its systems but also its IT services provider.

The celebrations of the Co-op creating a contender of scale to compete against the Big 5 banks may be a little premature.

Friday, 18 May 2012

RBS forced to go down under for Retail Banking chief



RBS has announced that its new head of Retail Banking will be Ross McEwan. Despite the Scottish name, which undoubtedly is helpful at RBSG, Mr McEwan is from down under. He replaces Australian Brian Hartzer who is returning to his homeland to take up a similar role at Westpac (see http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2011/11/wanted-ceo-for-uk-retail-bank.html ). It is not only native Australians that are making the journey down under, but there has been a flood of banking executives working in the UK who have decided to up sticks and move to the Southern Hemisphere (see http://www.itsafinancialworld.net/2012/01/trickle-becomes-flood-as-bankers-leave.html ).

Whilst a number of UK banking executives were approached and interviewed for the role that Ross McEwan will fill none of them were interested. This has to raise the question why? Certainly for executives with successful careers at banks free of government shareholdings such as HSBC and Santander there are clear reasons why a move to RBSG may hold little appeal. Given the turgid time Stephen Hester has had with his compensation and personal life discussed very publicly in the press and in Parliament to the point where even he considered resigning, why would anyone put themselves into that position when they don't need to? With the level of government implicit and explicit interference in the running of RBSG, there have to be better places to work. For the ambitious executive who sees heading Retail Banking at RBS as a career stepping stone the question is what would be the move after that? Almost certainly not into the CEO role of one of the UK banks as RBSG is a damaged brand and there are no obvious CEO roles coming up at the UK banks in the next few years. The probability is, as evidenced by Brian Hartzer, that the next move after heading up Retail Banking at RBSG would most likely be a CEO role in Australia. Not all UK banking executives or their families would see that as attractive.

With the Vickers ICB (Independent Commission on Banking)  recommendations coming into law including the ring-fencing of retail banking, the increased scutiny of bankers' compensation and the antagonistic attitude of British politicians towards bankers, the UK Government has made a career in UK banking very unattractive. For the state-backed banks, RBSG and Lloyds Banking Group, this has been made even more unattractive which means that these organisations are finding it even more difficult to attract top talent. The time it has taken for Lloyds Banking Group to find a replacement for Truett Tate, the head of Wholesale Banking is just one example of this.

Yet it needs to be recognised that to turn around these banks top talent is needed because these are some of the toughest challenges.

RBSG and Lloyds Banking Group are not alone in struggling to hire and retain top talent, it appears that having recruited Rumi Contractor from HSBC to become the UK Retail  and Business Banking COO in January that they have already parted company.

With HSBC CEO Stuart Gulliver suggesting that, with the increased cost of conducting retail banking, that pulling out of the UK is a real possibility, resulting in significant layoffs, reducing the number of  quality UK banking executives dramatically, there is a serious threat to the sector.

For the UK to retain its position as one of the key the Financial Services centres of the world, the sector needs to be able to attract the right talent. This is critical to the recovery of the UK economy. Isn't it about time that the politicians took the lead and put an end to the relentless bashing of the banks?

Friday, 4 May 2012

Why Lloyds shouldn't dismiss selling Scottish Widows



Following the rumour that private equity vehicle Tungsten, formed by Duke Street founder Edmund Turrell and his brother, was preparing a multi-billion bid for Scottish Widows, Antonio Horta-Osorio, CEO of Lloyds Banking Group, stated that the Group was 'absolutely' not selling Scottish Widows. Should Horta-Osorio have adopted the Sean Connery line regarding his return as Bond and said 'never say never' - was he over hasty in his response? Is there no price at which Lloyds should sell Scottish Widows? There are many reasons why the disposal of Scottish Widows should not be dismissed out of hand.

Scottish Widows was bought in 2000 for £7bn by the then Lloyds TSB CEO, Peter Ellwood, ably assisted by his deputy Mike Fairey. At the time many thought that Lloyds TSB had overpaid for  Widows, but it was a major plank in Peter Ellwood's strategy to build a major bancassurer. He was not alone at that time having a vision of creating a money supermarket, a one-stop shop for retail financial services from a bank. This vision was shared across the globe with the likes of Citibank acquiring Travellers and ING and AXA all pursuing this vision. However that was with the optimism of the new millennium and now in 2012 following the financial crisis most, if not all of those who adopted this strategy have abandoned it.

Certainly one reason that bancassurance has proved not to be successful is the fundamental difference in culture between a retail bank and a life assurance company. Retail banking is all about transactions, taking a short term view - daily interest charges, leveraging the differences between the deposit and the lending rates, taking and managing risk, whereas life assurance is much more focused on the long term with low volumes of transactions and risk aversity. Bringing the cultures of these two types of business together is like trying to mix oil and water, as has been shown in the market.

Apart from the cultural differences there are other reasons why Lloyds Banking Group could be better off without Scottish Widows. With the impending imposition of  Solvency II regulation, insurers are going to be required to hold higher levels of capital than they currently do, which will make doing the business of life assurance more expensive. Layer on top of that, for the likes of Lloyds Banking Group, Basel III and the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) and the capital requirements are even higher. Long gone is the efficiency of being able to apply the same capital to both the insurance company and the bank. With the cost of acquiring capital being a lot higher than it was at the beginning of the century this further increases the cost of simply doing business.

It is surprising that Antonio Horta-Osorio is defending the bancassurance model, since the bank he came from, Banco Santander, one of the banks that has survived the financial crisis better than most, despite being headquartered in Spain, has always vehemently argued against both the bancassurance model and investment banking and could justifiably say that they have been proved correct. It was most commentators' expectations that given his experience and training that Antonio Horta-Osorio would see the disposal of Scottish Widows as one of his highest priorities.

Another reason to be shot of Scottish Widows is the introduction of the rules coming out of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR). RDR fundamentally challenges the bancassurance model, makes the cost of selling life assurance and investment products much higher. It has seen Barclays and HSBC amongst others, withdraw from selling mass market assurance products and subsequently laying off thousands od staff in the process. Lloyds Banking Group  is almost a lone voice on the high street still offering assurance and investment advice to the mass market. This may be a smart decision on the part the Group or could it be that the others are all correct?

Certainly if there is someone prepared to make a good offer for Scottish Widows then it could be in shareholders' (and that means UK tax-payers and the UK Government) best interests that LBG makes the deal as this would be a rapid way of paying down debt and should see a significant increase in share price.

The cost and difficulty of separating Scottish Widows from the rest of Lloyds Banking Group is far lower and far simpler than that of separating the 632 Verde branches that LBG is negotiating with Co-Operative Financial Services. The reason for this is that, despite Lloyds TSB acquiring Scottish Widows in 2000, the level of integration between Scottish Widows and the rest of Lloyds Banking Group is relatively low. It has been managed largely at arms length and therefore carving out would not be that difficult, so this is a deal that could be executed relatively quickly and the benefits achieved faster than other disposals.

Certainly if Scottish Widows was sold that would give Antonio Horta-Osorio and his team the chance to focus on the core issue of restoring what was a great and much-admired bank not just back to where it was before it was forced to buy HBoS, but to be even better and even more a bank for customers of the 21st century.

Monday, 12 March 2012

Why the culture of banks has to change



With the FSA (Financial Services Authority) report on what went wrong at HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) before the bank had to be rescued by the UK Government and Lloyds TSB clearly showing that the issue was one of governance, there has never been a time when the need to change the culture of the banks has been clearer or more urgent.

The FSA report demonstrates that the corporate lending division of HBOS had a far riskier book than any of the other UK banks. HBOS continued to win deals in both the commercial and retail property markets in the UK, Ireland and Australia at lower margins and higher risks at a time when all the other banks were reducing their exposure to the sector or no longer pursuing new business. HBOS proudly proclaimed their success and growth in the market, not recognising that they alone were doing this. It doesn't appear to have crossed the minds of the executive that they were winning business that no one else wanted, or at least no one wanted at the rates that HBOS were offering. When the Head of the division proposed a growth of 10-12% in commercial lending not only was this not challenged he was told by the CEO of HBOS that this needed to be increased to 22%.

How could this situation have arisen?

The CEO of HBOS, Andy Hornby, had arrived at HBOS triumphantly from ASDA, part of the Walmart Group. With no background in Financial Services but having graduated top of his course at Harvard and having had a successful career with the strategy consultancy, Boston Consulting Group prior to ASDA, he was seen as the person who would shake up the sleepy financial services industry. He surrounded himself with people who agreed with his position. Those who didn't agree with him got short shrift. Benny Higgins (currently CEO of Tesco Financial Services), had joined from RBS, where he had had a very successful career, to lead the HBOS retail banking business. He left after only a very short while when he fell out with Andy Hornby over strategy.

What this meant was that no one was there to challenge the strategy and the decisions that the CEO of HBOS was taking. Not dissimilar to the situation that was described in the recent report on what went wrong with the corporate governance at RBSG under the leadership of Fred Goodwin.

It is undoubtedly for this reason that the FSA is asking for a change at the Co-operative if they wish to push ahead with the acquisition of the Verde branches from Lloyds Banking Group. The FSA are insisting that the board of the Co-op must have much more experience of Financial Services and be able to challenge the executive leadership of Co-operative Financial Services. This could be such a significant challenge for the Co-op to make them question whether they will continue to pursue the deal. Finding people who the FSA will approve to run or sit on the board of a bank is increasingly difficult. It took Tesco over two and half years to get approval to set up their bank. The FSA has an increasingly large backlog of people to be approved to work in senior roles for banks and it now takes months to get approvals for an individual, even if that individual has already been approved for a similar role at the bank or a rival bank. Such a delay in being able to pushed forward with Verde could make the deal so unattractive to the Co-op that they walk away from it. However given what went on at HBOS and RBSG it is not difficult to understand why the FSA is pushing for this.

The culture of banks where the CEO's and other executives' words are final and unchallengeable is not something new and has always been dangerous.

A recent example of this is the fine raised on RBSG for complaints. The fine was not for the poor service that RBSG was giving its customers but for the fact that the complaints received were modifed by staff before being submitted to the Banking Ombudsman. The reason given being that the staff were afraid of the consequences for their careers of the complaints being upheld. What does this say about the culture at RBSG today, many years after Fred Goodwin left?

A further example that illustrates why the culture needs to change is that of the misselling of PPI (Payment Protection Insurance). It was known throughout the banking industry that both personal loans and mortgages were being sold at prices below cost and subsidised by the excessively high margins on PPI policies, which were very hard to claim on. Yet because it was so profitable no one spoke out and the number of PPI policies that were sold grew exponentially. Why did no one speak out? Surely the hierarchical, command and control culture of the banks has to be key to this along with the pursuit of short term profits at the cost of the customer.

The £8.75m fine imposed on Coutts, owned by RBSG, for not putting in adequate measures to ensure that the money-laundering wasn't taking place or that they were doing business with PEPS (Politically Exposed Persons). One of the reasons cited by the FSA for this behaviour was that staff were incentivised to add additional customers and balances with no measure about the quality of the balances or the customers, is yet more evidence for the need for a fundamental shift in the culture enforced by alignment of incentives with the values that the banks should be upholding.

Without a fundamental change to the culture of banks, where both independent, experienced voices are listended to and encouraged to challenge the exexcutive of banks and with CEOs and senior executives who encourage their staff to challenge their thinking without fear of reprisals then another HBOS, PPI misselling or the latest misselling of derivatives to SMEs is inevitable.

Thursday, 5 May 2011

PPI - A sign of the mad, bad world

The announcement that Antonio Horta-Osorio, the new CEO of Lloyds Banking Group has decided to draw a line under the sorry PPI (Payment Protection Insurance) situation, take a reserve of £3.2bn and withdraw from the BBA (British Bankers' Association) appeal against the recent judgement should be welcomed as a sensible, pragmatic move and hopefully bring a close to the mad, bad world that was operating at the time that the misselling was taking place.

When the sale of PPI was at its peak the banks and finance houses were working in a market where personal loans were being sold at a loss as competition had driven the prices down and demand for funds driven the wholesale prices up. Banks and Finance Houses were prepared to sell these loans at a loss because they were able to sell Payment Protection Insurance at such a high premium, with very little chance of a claim against them due to the convoluted terms and conditions. Staff were heavily incentivised to sell PPI because that was where the profit came from and as a result hard-selling took place.

Consumers actually got loans at lower interest rates than they should have, so a good proportion of customers (primarily those who didn't take out PPI) were getting a good deal, so it wasn't all a terrible rip off for bank customers.

Hopefully the other banks and Finance Houses will follow the lead set by Lloyds Banking Group and draw this sorry episode to a halt. (UPDATE: All the other major banks have followed suit with RBSG writing off £850m, Santander £538m, Barclays £1bn and HSBC £270m or a total just under £6bn). That doesn't mean that everyone who claims should get their money back, because there are a surprisingly large number of claims being made by people who either didn't take out PPI or worse still didin't even take out a loan. The process of weeding out the fraudulent claims and processing the valid claims will undoubtedly take some time.

What should happen now is that loans and credit cards move to being priced realistically, based on the wholesale market prices and with a reasonable risk-adjusted price. This may be a shock to customers, but at least it will represent a fair price.

The fall out from the financial crisis is that retail banking needs to change, but the changes and expectations need to be not only on the banks' side but also the consumers.

Wednesday, 4 May 2011

Why the Big 5 banks should be pushing for the end of 'free banking' (and the government shouldn't)

With the ICB (Independent Commission on Banking) looking at increasing competition in the retail banking sector, examining the market share of the big banks and overall looking for greater fairness and transparency in charging, strongly supported by the likes of Vince Cable and other politicians, increasingly it looks as if the end of 'free banking' is in sight. Of course 'free banking' doesn't really exist, rather it is a mirage in that rather than paying directly for the services provided, consumers are made to pay by low or no interest rates for money deposited in current accounts, low interest rates in deposit accounts, high mortgage rates and even higher overdraft charges. As consumers baulk at the costs charged for loans and going overdrawn and politicians continually call for fairer, transparent charges, the inevitable conclusion is a banking system where customers pay for the services they use.

Being able to charge a direct amount for the services they provide would bring some significant advantages to the big banks in the heavily regulated environment that they are increasingly operating in. When there is more focus on the market share that each of the banks has, and where more market share is seen as bad, then the banks will want to focus not on the absolute market share but the quality of the market share.

All of the big banks today have customers that they don't make any money from. These will be the types of customers that open a current account for their household money, for their book club, for their children, where the balances are low, transactions sizes are small and they have only one product. If market share is going to be restricted then these are the customers that the banks are going to want to be shot of. The problem is that in today's banking environment it is very difficult for a bank to fire customers. However if customers were made to pay directly for the services that they use then it would be far easier for the banks to adjust their charges to either makes the low balance/low transaction value customers profitable or, better still for the banks, to encourage those customers to take their business elsewhere.

With four out of the five big banks now being run by investment bankers not retail bankers, and Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds Banking Group focussed on a strategy of raising their Return on Equity (ROE) up to at least the 14-15% range, then there is clear evidence that making customers pay directly for the services they use can help achieve this. In Australia where this model has existed for many years, The 'Four Pillars' (National Australia, Commonwealth Bank, WestPac and ANZ), have in the past enjoyed ROEs of 20+%. Even with tougher regulation they are each expecting ROEs of around 16%, significantly higher than any of the UK banks.

However whilst this all sounds very attractive for the big banks, it is not great for the new entrants, who will struggle to compete with the scale advantages that will allow the big banks to make their charges attractive for the customers they want. It also raises the big question of who will provide the banking services to the customers that the big banks don't want? It has the potential to significantly increase the number of the unbanked. As the likes of Vince Cable continue their crusade against the banks and push for ever more transparency of charging for banking services, the politicians need to be wary of the consequences of getting what they wish for.